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ABST RACT
This Article develops a novel analytic framework for the evaluation of
regulatory policy in cyberspace, flowing from a reconceptualization of cyberlaw’s
central premise: software code as complementary to law rather than its substitute.
This approach emphasizes the linkage between law and software; for every quantum
of legal-regulatory impact, there is a corresponding equilibria of regulation-bysoftware. The absence of a legal right will stimulate a technological response—and
such incentives will moderate with increased rights. Rather than “code is law,” this
is “code meets law.”
The implications of this methodological shift are explored in the context of the
emerging (and intensely controversial) cyberproperty right—defined as the right to
exclude others from one’s network resources. The debate over whether (and how,
and why) concepts of property rights can be extended to bits stored on web servers,
email systems and the like is both deeply intertwined with technology and
fundamentally comparative in nature, bringing the importance of understanding the
regulatory costs and benefits of software (as compared to law) into sharp relief.
The analysis that emerges suggests that, contrary to much of the relevant
scholarly literature (and perhaps counterintuitively), the availability of
technological mechanisms to replace legal rights likely strengthens, rather than
weakens, the case for legal regulation in the form of property rights. At least in this
context, a software-centric regulatory approach is dominated by regimes premised
on property-backed contractual relationships.
Considering the regulatory environment of cyberspace from this perspective
may have profound effects on the way we think about the form and function of law
online. The nature of cyberspace as particularly sensitive to emerging concerns
about the tyranny of software suggests that the online environment might be more
suited for a broad property rights regime than has been recognized to date.
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I

Above all else, the story of the field of cyberlaw is a tale of two codes: law
and software. The most significant principle to emerge from the academic study
of law on the Internet is the idea that software code—the applications, operating
systems, and protocols that determine the way we experience the online
world—is broadly substitutable for legal code—the regulatory infrastructure of
society. 1 Code is law; architecture is control; software is power.
While there is no question that the basic point is correct, it is nonetheless the
case that widespread acceptance of the “code is law” meme has perhaps
obscured the kaleidoscopic relationship between legal code and software code.2
For though it is certainly true that both software and law have important
regulatory effects, this fact does not support their fungiblility: Code may indeed
be law, but not all code is equal. And understanding the complexities of this
connection is profoundly important to understanding the path of cyberlaw.

In a series of seminal works in the late 1990s, several legal academics
posited that technology has profound regulatory effects in the online
environment.3 As Lawrence Lessig stated:

1

See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 6 (1999) [hereinafter
Lessig, Code]; Lessig, Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
501 (1999) [hereinafter Lessig, Horse]; Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First
Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. L. Forum 335 (1996); Joel
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 Texas L. Rev. 553 (1998); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace:
Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 177 (1997). For nonlegal treatments, see also William Mitchell, City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Infobahn 111
(1995); Andrew Shapiro, The Control Revolution (1999).
2

Tim Wu makes a similar point. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 Va. L. Rev.
679, 681-82 (2003).
3

See, e.g., Lessig, Code, supra note 1, at 6; Lessig, Horse, supra note 1, at 503; Katsh,

–1 –
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In real space we recognize how law regulates—through
constitutions, statutes, and other legal codes. In cyberspace we must
understand how code regulates—how the software and hardware
that make cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace as it is. As
William Mitchell puts it, this code is cyberspace’s ‘law’. Code is
law.4

This insight into the power and importance of software code in this context
has become both broadly accepted and widely discussed.5 Its implications are
disputed: some commentators, most prominently Lessig, suggest that
technology—harnessed by commercial interests—is likely to substantially limit
freedom in cyberspace;6 others, (as Tim Wu aptly describes) argue that software
code “will arise as a kind of utopian sovereign to improve on perceived failures
of state regulation.”7 Still others, while not disagreeing with the central code-islaw point, inquire as to whether it raises much of an issue at all.8
As important as the ongoing debate, however, is what is not debated. The
idea that code has regulatory effects similar to law is firmly cemented into the
consciousness of cyberscholars.9 And for good reason: it would be an unusually
imperceptive internet user who would fail to intuit the behavioral effects of
everyday features of cyberspace, such as password requirements, web site
registrations, etc. Indeed, the regulatory nature of technology is a point not at all
confined to cyberspace; fences are traditional forms of property control, and
closing one’s office door clearly regulates the passage of light, sounds, and
people.10 (The concept’s import in cyberspace comes from the uniquely mutable

supra note 1, at 340; Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 554; Boyle, supra note 1, at 182.
4

Code, 6.

5

See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure
in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (2001); Kenneth W. Dam,
Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. Legal Stud. 393 (1999); Wu, supra note 2, at 682; Wu,
When Law & the Internet First Met, 3 Green Bag 2d 171 (2000); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace
as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 439, 443 (2003);
Orin Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 Geo. L.J. 357, 359 (2003).
6

See, e.g., Lessig, Code, supra note 1, at 6.

7

Wu, supra note 2, at 683.

8

See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi.
Legal F. 207; Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199 (1998).
9

Indeed, a July 2003 search in the LEXIS ALR database using the following query
"code is law" and (software OR technology OR internet OR cyberspace)

returned 759 hits.
10

E.g., Lessig, Code, supra note 1, at 86-90.
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nature of the computer technology that forms the online world.)11 In sum, Code
Is Law contains an essential truth that is both attractive and impossible to ignore.
Yet there is a way in which this central descriptive principle disserves as
well. For Code is Law carries with it what might be said to be the implication of
equivalence: an unstated premise going to the relationship between “code” and
“law.” Specifically, the code-is-law meme at least evokes the idea that software
code and legal code are somehow regulatory substitutes. But as should be
obvious, this does not necessarily follow, logically or factually: That technology
has regulatory impact does not suggest that it is directly interchangeable with
law, and it is easy to understand how the regulatory mechanisms differ.12 Note
that this is not to suggest that the pioneers of the code-is-law principle stated as
much, or even that they failed to understand this point.13 Nobody, for example,
seems to argue directly that any particular snippet of software can directly
substitute for a particular statutory provision. And yet, lurking in the
background of much recent work that accepts as true the Code is Law proviso is
the question of the relationship: how, exactly, does regulation-by-software
compare to regulation-by-law, and how do the two interact?
Indeed, the understanding that software code (as well as law) can have
regulatory effects itself demands inquiry into the nature of the relationship.14
For if either software or law can provide a relevant legal infrastructure, then
policymakers have a choice. And if software and law regulate in different ways,
with different strengths, weaknesses, costs, and benefits, then that
choice—regulation-by-software or regulation-by-law—will have crucial
implications.15 Further, in the cyberspace context, law and software will
necessarily coexist, so the analysis is not only comparative, but dynamic—a
complex, multidimensional question. To no small degree, the answer will (and
should) drive the policy decisions that determine the emerging regulatory

11

See Lessig, Horse, supra note 1, at 507.

12

See id. at 509-510.

13

Indeed, Lessig in particular importantly presaged this line of analysis, noting that
what he called ‘modalities of regulation’ would both compete and interact. See Lessig,
Horse, supra note 1, at 508-10. See also Lawrence Lessig and Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech
On The Internet: A Legal And Technical Model, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1999).
14

Tim Wu has recently (and importantly) asked a similar question, noting that software
code can at times be used to avoid or mitigate the effects of legal rules. See generally Wu,
supra note 2. As noted below, this observation fits well into the analytic structure derived
here. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
15

See, e.g., Lessig, Code, supra note 1, at 6-9; Lessig, Horse, supra note 1, at 512.
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infrastructure of cyberlaw.16
This Article develops an analytic framework for understanding the
regulatory environment in the context of law and software. At its core, the
approach here is part reminder, part reconceptualization: embracing the basic
truth of the regulatory effects of both software and legal code, yet rejecting their
equivalence. Instead, the relationship between law and software in cyberspace
regulation is conceived as essentially complementary; it is the interface of law
and software that establishes the complete regulatory conditions. This lawsoftware interface is defined by a rough equilibrium—a mix of regulatory effects
established by a complex (and deeply contextual) mixture of legal effects,
technological circumstances, and private cost-benefit analyses. In this complex
world, less “law” does not necessarily mean less regulation. Instead, in many
cases it will imply greater regulation by software; the net regulatory effects are
dependent upon the interactions along the law-software interface. 17 Similarly,
changes in the technological (software) environment will advance responsive
changes in legal rules, yielding perhaps more or perhaps less regulation, under
different circumstances.18 It is this elemental relationship—between law and
software, legal code and software code, lawyers and coders—that provides both
the greatest challenge to policymakers in this new frontier of regulation, and the
greatest reward for appreciating it.
The understanding of the law-software interface developed in this Article
provides a number important insights into the problem of modern regulatory
environments. The first is that policy analysis in this context cannot simply
consider legal changes; the software-regulatory response must also be
considered.19 Indeed, in many cases, the response may be difficult to predict ex
ante, meaning that the net regulatory effects are likely to be unclear.20 Less
“law” might result in a greater overall regulatory condition—or simply no effect
at all. A second key observation is that dynamism is the rule rather than the
exception.21 Driven by continuing changes in technology, as well as new
innovations in models of creating and distributing information, the law-software
interface will be under constant pressure. This suggests that regulatory policy
16

See, id.

17

Lessig makes a related point. See, e.g., Lessig, Code, supra note 1, at 189 (the
absence of law “will cause a shift in effective regulatory power - from law to code, from
sovereigns to software.”)
18

See, e.g., Wu, supra note 2, at 682.

19

See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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must search for flexible solutions, and that efforts to codify a ‘current’
understanding of the Internet, for example, are unlikely to succeed.
And yet there is a dark side to the emergence of software code as a regulator.
The very features of software that make it a viable (and often attractive)
alternative to legal regulation can have troubling public effects, at least as
compared to legal regulation.22 Software regulation lacks forms of regulatory
‘safety valves’—for example, the involvement (even cursory) of third parties,
which serves to temper ‘extreme’ arrangements. Software regulation does not
generally require evaluation of enforcement costs: marginal costs are near zero.
And the scaling effects of software (software ‘regulates’ essentially the same
irrespective of amount of use) are quite different from legal regulation.
Together, these factors suggest rather strongly that the over-use of software
regulation will yield a regulatory environment that is at once more extreme and
less stable than that with more participation from law. This in turn suggests that
an important criterion for policy analysis in cyberspace is the potentially-large
social benefit of more law and less software.23
Understanding the law-software interface can also greatly influence the
choice of a legal rule-form. Just as simply considering legal options for
cyberlaw is deeply incomplete, the choice of legal form here is not simply
between the traditional categories of property rules and liability rules.24 A third
form of legal rule—the direct control of software regulatory effects, denoted
here as legal preemption—must also be considered. In addition to this added
axis of evaluation, the insight noted above—the detrimental public effects of
software—forces evaluation of legal rule-forms according to both their
normative effects (How well does the rule perform overall?) and their
instrumental effects (How well does the rule form affect the law-software
interface?). Adding these factors into the analysis suggests that the key choice
in this context is between relatively strong forms of property rules and hybrid

22

Note that this is a different set of concerns about the rise of regulatory software code
than those articulated by Lessig. See generally Lessig, Code, supra note 1. Lessig’s chief
concern relates to who controls software code—particularly private, commercially-interested
parties, who may not (indeed, likely do not) have the general public interest in mind. See id.
The elements of the case against software developed here are inherent in the nature of
software-as-regulator, rather than being contingent on the identity of the code writer. See
infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. Thus, these concerns hold even where the
software code is developed using ‘open source’ methods, which Lessig suggests would
moderate his concerns. See, e.g., Lessig, Code, supra note 1, at 100-109,
23
24

See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.

See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1972).
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rules containing forms of legal preemption.25
Applying the analytic framework developed here to one of the most complex
and controversial regulatory challenges in cyberspace—the question of the
appropriate entitlement regime for access to network-connected resources, or
cyberproperty—confirms its utility as a tool for cyberlaw policy analysis.26 In
stepping through the analytic framework developed by this Article, a possible
legal rule for cyberproperty emerges: a hybrid approach of a broad property rule,
a default condition in favor of open access, and a form of legal preemption
supporting software mechanisms to facilitate notice and/or transactions. More
important than the result, however, is the process—the integration of the
multifaceted relationship between law and software into analysis of modern
regulatory choices.

Considering the regulatory environment of cyberspace from the perspective
of the framework of this Article may have profound effects on the way we think
about the form and function of law online. Less law does not mean more
freedom. The over-reliance on software regulation can have negative social
consequences. Flexibility in legal rules is paramount; traditional liability rules
appear to be especially unsuited for this environment. And while the case is far
from clear (and subject to a number of contextual dependencies), the nature of
cyberspace as particularly sensitive to emerging concerns about the tyranny of
software suggests that the online environment might be more suited for a broad
property rights regime than has been widely recognized. Code is law, but law is
better.

25

See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.

26

For major cyberproperty-related cases, see, e.g., Intel, Corp. v Hamidi, No. S103781
(Cal., June 30, 2003); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal.
2000); Thifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (1996); Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio,
Inc. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
For academic treatments, see, e.g., Richard Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev.
73 (2003); David McGowan, Website Access: The Case for Consent, __ Loy-Chi. L. J. __
(forthcoming 2003); Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Websites, 1996 J.
Online L. art. 7; Dan L. Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. Law
27 (2000); Nina Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right
to Exclude Indexing, 49 J. copyright Soc’y 165 (2001); Maureen O’Rourke, Property Rights
and Competition on the Internet: In Search of An Appropriate Analogy, 16 Berkeley Tech.
L. J. 561 (2001) [hereinafter O’Rourke, Analogy]; Maureen O’Rourke, Shaping Competition
on the Internet; Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 Van. L. Rev. 1965 (2000)
[hereinafter O’Rourke, Shaping Competition].
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What follows has four parts, beginning, in Section II, with the outline of the
basic analytic framework, establishing the concept of the law-software interface,
and exploring the complexities in determining the equilibrium point that will
determine the regulatory condition.
Section III builds on this framework by noting the serious concerns inherent
in software regulation, suggesting that in many cases a policy goal should be to
develop regulatory conditions with more law and less software.
Next, Section IV looks at how the understanding of the law-software
interface influences the choice of legal rules, and notes that such an approach is
likely to add at least some force to arguments in favor of property rules, in
addition to highlighting the importance of rules involving legal preemption.
Section V applies the foregoing analysis to the regulatory environment for
access to network connected resources—cyberproperty. The results suggest both
that the framework here is viable, and that it might offer additional force to the
arguments in favor of modified property rules.
Section VI provides a brief conclusion.

II
T H E L AW –S O F T WA R E I N T E R FA C E :
A N A N A LY T I C F R A M E W O R K

This section provides a basic analytic framework for thinking about the
relationship between the two major regulatory modes of cyberspace noted above,
law and software.27 This construct emerges from the observation that the lawsoftware relationship in cyberspace is primarily defined by complementarity
rather than substitutability, fundamentally additive rather than subtractive. Put

27

As Lessig has aptly noted, social norms and the marketplace will each of course have
important regulatory effects in cyberspace, as they do in realspace. See Lessig, Horse, supra
note 1, at 507-10. For simplicity, and because the most interesting interaction for the
purposes of the online legal environment exists between law and software, the effects of
norms and the market will be noted less systematically, though their most important effects
will be described.
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more simply, for a given regulatory condition, the impact of law—cases,
statutes, etc.—will deeply influence the impact of software. Indeed, the idea
here is to think in terms of equilibria, the natural resting point on the lawsoftware interface.
Conceptualizing the relationship between law and software in this manner
brings at least two important implications into sharp relief. First, the analysis of
policy options in the cyberspace context will necessarily be dynamic in nature,
requiring consideration of not only (for example) legal adjustments, but also
predicting the responsive effects such changes will stimulate in software
regulation. That is, policy arguments, proposals, and critiques in this brave new
world will be fundamentally incomplete without careful attention to both legal
and software effects, and the integrated relationship between the two.
Second, the rapidly advancing pace of software development and
deployment, as well as the resulting instability of any law-software equilibrium
conditions, points out the deep-seated challenges inherent in policy development
in cyberspace. Indeed, these problems appear to be so fundamental—and
particularly acute for certain institutional actors, such as the judiciary—as to
suggest that over-reliance on software regulatory techniques as a policy lever
will be counterproductive. A close look at the law-software interface might lead
to the conclusion that an overarching policy goal for cyberspace might be to
build more law—and less software.
A. Cod e Meet s Law

That software code in the cyberspace context is regulatory in effect is not
seriously debated.28 The more pressing inquiry relates to the nature of the
law–software relationship, and its effects on the behavioral infrastructure of
cyberspace.29 The analytic framework developed and explored here is based on
the following premises:
(a) Both legal code and software code have regulatory effects;
(b) Legal effects and software effects are interrelated—a change
in one regulatory mode will affect the other (at least over the
medium-to-long term); and
(c) The total regulatory condition is the product of both legal

28

Though the normative implications of this are controversial. See supra notes 5-8 and
accompanying text.
29

See, e.g., Wu, supra note 2, at 679.
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regulatory effects and software regulatory effects.

Figure 1, below, depicts the basic point here graphically.

Figure 1: The Law-Software Interface

Here, the axes represent the effects (or impact) of the two regulatory modes,
law (y-axis) and software (x-axis).30 A greater “regulatory effect” means a
greater impact on behavior; for example in a paradigmatic property-rights case,
greater regulatory effect means greater protection to property owners. The total
regulatory effect is the area defined by the law-software interface. Consider
regulatory Condition A above, with a given legal impact (here, 4), and a
software effect (here, 2). In the

30

Again, to be complete the Figure should encompass four dimensions, corresponding
to each of law, software, norms, and the market as having regulatory effects. See, e.g.,
Lessig, Code, supra note 1, at 52-54. The author, however, found it problematic to
graphically describe the more encompassing relationship.
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Figure 1 construct, the equilibrium condition is depicted as point a (2,4), and
the total regulatory effect is designated as 2 x 4 = 8.
Less abstractly, and using the cyberproperty example central to this paper,
regulatory Condition A can be said to represent the total excludability that
owners of Internet-connected resources (web servers, email systems, etc.)
enjoy—that is, the content of the “cyberproperty” right. That quantum of
regulatory effect (again, designated as 8 here) is the product of both legal
protections—perhaps state-backed property-type rights (doctrinally, a remedy for
trespass)31, and software-constructed protections, such as link-denial code,
password protections, or others.32
Another useful example is copyright. In this context, Condition A in Figure
1 represents the total appropriability provided to the creator of an expressive
intellectual good: the “copyright”. The legal regulatory effects are established by
the protections and limitations of Title 17 of the United States Code.33 The
technological effects include both the availability of protection-enhancing
software, such as Digital Rights Management (DRM), as well as the existence of
what Tim Wu describes as “anti-regulatory” code—software that undermines the
appropriability of the work.34 This example (in both its dimensions) illustrates
that the impact of both law and software must be considered on a net basis. Just
as software in the digital media context (to give one example) has both proprotection and anti-protection effects, the Copyright Act both provides legal
protections and sets legal limits.35 What is important for establishing the
equilibrium, and thus total appropriation, is the net effects of each regulatory
system, law and software.

B. Equ ilibri um at the Law-Software Int erface

Having established the basic terms of Figure 1—what is meant by the law-

31

As I note in the discussion in Section V below, the uncertainty associated with the
existence, scope, and nature of the legal protections for the “cyberproperty” right has
important policy consequences.
32

See infra Section V below for a detailed look at the software-regulatory options.

33

See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106.

34

The canonical example, and the one discussed in detail by Wu, is peer-to-peer
software products, which allow for easy—and only partially regulable—exchange of
copyrighted goods (typically music or movies) between network users. Wu, supra note 2, at
700-02.
35

Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 with 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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software equilibrium—it next becomes crucial to understand the response
mechanisms that produce this condition. One important point here is that the
responses can be expected to flow in both directions: legal conditions will
provoke a technological response, and technological circumstances can prompt
legal changes. In cyberspace, neither legal nor software code exists in a
vacuum; their tight coexistence creates a continual feedback loop.
Note that the equilibrium-response posited here, for both law and software,
is driven by private cost-benefit considerations.36
There are of course
tremendously important public effects and responses, as discussed in Section III
below; the point of the analytic framework here is to describe the impact of
private decision-making on the regulatory environment.
Put most directly, equilibrium at the law-software interface is determined by
the contextual cost-benefit functions of the law and software regulatory
mechanisms. For example, given a legal regulatory condition, greater software
regulation will be deployed (moving the equilibrium point to the right in
Figure 1 above) where it is cost-effective to do so, where the gains outweigh
the costs. Again, consider the cyberproperty example. Absent any technology
effects, a web site owner will have a certain level of legal protections against
unwanted use of her network resources: certainly protections against outright
hacking, perhaps protections based on unauthorized access as a form of trespass,
perhaps rights established by a Terms of Service (TOS) contract with users, and
maybe rights emanating from copyright law. Each of these legal rights and
remedies of course has related costs and difficulties, most prominently the costs
of enforcement, but also costs related to effectiveness—for example, as
generally ex post mechanisms, they trigger themselves only after a violation
arises, which may offer less protection in the dynamic Internet environment.37
Accounting for both the de jure protections and their limits based on costs and
effectiveness yields a de facto (or net) level of legal regulatory effect.
Evaluating this net legal impact presents the web site owner with a choice
concerning whether to deploy software-based regulatory mechanisms. For

36

They also represent average behavior. Obviously, in the absence of explicit
restrictions otherwise, see infra text accompanying note 46, individual responses to legal
effects will vary. The Figures here are intended to convey the overall overage response
rather than suggest that all players will behave the same.
37

For example, if the harm the web site operator suffered as a result of an unwanted link
was a sudden rush of traffic that exceeded the capacity of the web server, either causing a
crash that resulted in at least temporary downtime or greatly slowing access to the site, an ex
post remedy would seem pyrrhic; though if monetary damages could be calculated, in theory
they might be recovered. Similarly, the possibility of an injunction against future unwanted
links might be useful in some cases.
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example she could implement a link-blocking mechanism based on the http
protocol that is intended to allow traffic only from designated referring web
pages.38 The use of this technique will of course increase the level of protection
against unwanted use of network resources, though it obviously comes with a
series of related costs, both monetary and otherwise.39 Ultimately, deployment
will depend upon the net software effects—the gains to be had from additional
software regulation—given the extant legal protection. Thus, under this
example, the location of point a in
Figure 1 is a function of these calculations. Again, this is the central lesson
of cyberlaw: regulatory effect (here, total protection) is the product of law and
software.40
Note also that the response-effects do not flow in only one direction.
Technological circumstances can drive legal changes. Consider the radical shifts
in the environment surrounding the music industry:41 These changes, ranging
from the advent of digital media to the development of peer-to-peer file sharing
software, have led the industry to seek (at times successfully)42 stronger legal
regulations, as well as yielded new litigation tactics calculated to increase the net
effects of the copyright law.43 Again in Figure1 terms, this moves point a
upwards, indicating a greater legal regulatory effect—and thus greater overall
regulatory conditions, assuming stable software effects.

38

I call this the http-referrer blocking technique. I discuss this and many other software
regulatory effects in Section V below.
39

As discussed at length in Section III below, a major cost of technological mechanisms
in the cyberproperty context, given the current state of the technology, is their inflexibility.
A http-referrer blocking technique offers a binary choice (block or no block), rather than the
more nuanced conditional blocking (block unless conditions x, y, and z are satisfied) that
might be more satisfactory to many web site operators. Another cost is that http-referrer
mechanisms are not too difficult to evade.
40

See supra note 1 (collecting sources).

41

See, e.g., Stanley A. Miller II, Peer-to-Peer Networks Are Here to Stay, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Mar. 25, 2003, at 4E, available at 2003 WL 3313281; Anna Wilde Mathews,
Martin Peers & Nick Wingfield, Off-Key: The Music Industry is Finally Online, But Few
Listen, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3393936.
42
43

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2002) (DMCA).

Lisa M. Bowman and Evan Hansen, Verizon to hand names over to RIAA, CNET
News.com, June 4, 2003, 4:44 PM PT, http://news.com.com/2100-1025-1013154.html. Note
that the record industry is pursuing a variety of fronts, including normative and
technological.
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C. Imp licati ons of Code Mee ts Law I: Dynami c Eff ects

Setting out this basic framework—understanding that regulatory conditions
are determined by the complementary effects of both law and software, and that
the intricate relationship between law and software is critical to the location of
the equilibrium point—leads to a number of important observations and
implications. Perhaps the most important, and most straightforward, of these
observations is that the law-software interface is profoundly dynamic in the
cyberspace context.44
That conditions change, of course, is unremarkable.
What makes the dynamic effects of the cyberspace regulatory environment
noteworthy is the interrelationship between the two regulatory modes: as
described above, the complementary relationship implies that changes along one
dimension will (certainly over the longer term) yield changes in the other.45
From a policy perspective, this observation is crucially important: it means that
policy adjustments in the cyberspace context cannot merely be contemplated as
one-dimensional changes (paradigmatically to legal scholars, changes in the
legal environment). Instead, a complete policy proposal or analysis in this arena
cannot afford to overlook the dynamics of the law-software relationship. That
is, a proposal for legal change is incomplete without predictions concerning the
software response to such a change: for, as noted above, it is the product of law
and software effects that determine the overall regulatory environment.
Consider, for example, Figure 2, depicting changes in conditions.

44

Indeed, this dynamism—driven primarily by technological (software) changes—is
fundamentally why the relationship between law and technology is so evidently important in
this area of the law, while it garners relatively less attention in other areas.
45

Obviously, there are quite likely to be short-term effects where the response to
changes in one regulatory mode are small to nonexistent. Given the nature of the legislative
and judicial system, one can expect these transitional effects to have more significance in
slowing legal changes in response to software developments than vice-versa.
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Figure 2

Figure 2 describes a change in legal regulatory effects (a decrease from 4 to
2; for example, the reduction or elimination of a cyberproperty right), and
explores the implications of various technological responses. Points b, c, d, and
e describe a range of possible software responses, each yielding a very different
overall regulatory environment. Condition B is the case where there are no
long-term software effects; perhaps because of the high cost of the software
regulatory mode (for example, it might be the case that the appropriate software
does not meaningfully exist, or is impossibly inflexible to be useful).46 In this
case, total regulatory effect reduces from an 8 in Condition A (2 x 4) to a 4 in
Condition B (2 x 2). Given a utilitarian model, one would thus expect a change
in output or development of the protected/regulated good in Condition B. This
could be either a positive or negative change, depending upon a variety of
assumptions about the development environment; for purposes of the illustration

46

Another possibility for Condition B, which I discuss more fully below, see infra notes
86-95 and accompanying text, is that the legal regulation directly implicates the software
regulation, perhaps by preempting or discouraging certain software deployments.
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here, the direction and magnitude of the output-effects are unimportant.
Condition C in Figure 2 describes the circumstance where software effects
increase somewhat in response to the decreasing legal regulatory effects. For
example, the reduction of the legal cyberproperty right might yield an increased
reliance on link-blocking software, such as http-referrers. This increase in
software effects, however, does not make up for the reduced legal effects, and
the overall regulatory effects drop to 6 (3 x 2). Again, one should expect a
change in output/development.
Condition D illustrates an increase in software effects of a magnitude that
renders no net change in regulatory environment. Here, law and software are
fungible, at least from a net regulatory effects perspective. (As discussed in Part
D. below, they are clearly not truly fungible even in this case, and there are
good reasons to believe a shift in the direction of additional software might be
socially harmful.) There should be little, if any change in overall output in the
shift from Condition A to Condition D.
Condition E describes an unlikely—but not implausible—scenario: where
the reduction in legal effects prompts a technological response of such a
dimension that it actually increases the overall regulatory effect. This could
occur, for example, if the increase in resources devoted to research and
development of software regulatory techniques (spurred by the drop in legal
effects) yielded a sort of cost-effectiveness breakthrough, allowing greatly
increased deployment of software mechanisms. Perhaps a reduction in the legal
force of Copyright law spurred research and development (R&D) into DRM
systems that enabled huge advances in effectiveness to be made.47 Condition E
could also occur where cost-effective software responses were profoundly
inflexible, essentially ‘forcing’ deployment of more effective protections. An
example here might be the reduction or elimination of the cyberproperty right,
resulting in dramatically-increased use of password-protected (or otherwise
individually-restricted) network resources. 48 Given the change in overall
regulatory effect (an increase to 10 (5 x 2)) Condition E will also feature
output/development effects, in the opposite direction from those resulting from
Conditions B and C.

47

Say, for example, “unbreakable” DRM systems, or even copy-protected CDs that
worked reliably.
48

Note of course that greater total protection (regulatory effects) is not necessarily in
the interest of the owner of the protected good (nor, of course, of society generally). If the
technology landscape was such that web site owners who wished to prevent unwanted access
were required to use the relatively blunt instrument password systems—and that because of
the costs of unwanted access, this was cost-effective—greater protection might indeed be
suboptimal for all concerned.
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The point of working through each of the Conditions in Figure 2 is to
illustrate the critical attention that must be paid to the law-software interface in
the cyberspace context. Legal-policy proposals unsupported by predictions of
technological response are deeply incomplete. Without an understanding of
whether the software response point will be b, c, d, or e, the best-laid policy
plans seem likely to go awry. For example, if a policy goal was to reduce the
overall regulatory effect in a particular context—perhaps to support wider web
linking by decreasing legal protection for network resources, or perhaps to
broaden re-use of copyrighted materials by expanding the notion of fair use—a
proponent would undoubtedly be quite disappointed to find that the reduction in
legal effects had resulted in no overall regulatory effects (Condition D in Figure
2) or had actually increased protection (Condition E in Figure 2). Indeed, even
an unexpected difference in end-state regulatory effects (say, between Condition
B and Condition C) could derail carefully-calibrated policy initiatives. The
intertwined relationship between law and software demands careful
consideration of each. Code is not equivalent to law, and it matters crucially in
cyberspace.

D. Imp licati ons
Unc ertain ty

of

Code

Mee ts

Law

II:

Unpredi ctabil ity

&

Having established the importance of analyzing the law-software
relationship to the regulatory content of cyberspace, the great difficulty of doing
so can now be explored. The following sections explores two distinct-butrelated points. First, predicting the software response to changes in the legal
environment is likely to be quite difficult in all cases, and especially difficult for
judicial actors, who are generally neither trained in software analysis, nor likely
to receive complete information concerning the range of possible software
effects to legal decisions. Second, given the rapid development of software
technologies (especially in the cyberspace context) in recent years, any “steadystate” equilibrium point (such as those depicted in Figures 1 and 2 above) would
appear to be fleeting, suggesting that analysis-based policymaking in cyberspace
requires hitting a moving target. Taken together, these points begin to make the
case that the overuse of software (or other technologies) as a policy lever could
be counterproductive.

1. Unpredictability

Perhaps no industry in recent memory has progressed as far and as fast as the
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software industry, burgeoning into a $245 billion business by the year 2000.49
Further, given the continuing rapid rate of increase in computer processing
power, it seems clear that the depth and breadth of software development will
continue unchecked for the foreseeable future.50
This rapid, and perhaps even accelerating, pace of innovation (and, more
significantly for purposes here, deployment) has important implications for the
regulation of cyberspace. Applications that seemed fanciful mere years ago,
such as television-on-demand,51 or seamless (and borderless) data file transfer,52
are now commonplace. The costs (and complexity) of publishing oneself in
cyberspace has plummeted rapidly.53 And yet still one gets the sense that only
the tip of the iceberg is yet showing.
Larry Lessig has powerfully argued that the spreading ubiquity in software is
not unreservedly a good thing, in major part because its most powerful
developers are generally commercially-motivated, and thus predictably place
myopic commercial interests ahead of the greater good.54 The argument here,
however, is that perhaps the unpredictability of software development and
deployment—uncertainties about the rate and direction of ongoing
innovation—places an even greater challenge in front of legal development in

49

See, e.g., US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 565 (2000)
(Communications & Information Technology).
50

See, e.g., Martin Campbell-Kelly, From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog:
A History of the Software Industry 303-05 (2003).
Advances in computer technology are driven in large part by the continuing
applicability of Moore’s Law, which posits that the density of transistors in semiconductor
manufacturing (and thus the underlying processing power available) will double
approximately every eighteen months. This observation has more or less held true since it
was first noted in 1965 (although Moore’s original prediction was actually a slightly more
optimistic doubling every year.) See, e.g., Gordon Moore, Cramming More Components
into Integrated Circuits, 38.8 Electronics (April 19, 1965); John Markoff, Is There Life After
Silicon Valley’s Fast Lane?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 09, 2003, at C1. Moore has recently
suggested that the ‘Law’ is likely to continue for some period into the future. See Gordon
Moore, No Exponential is Forever … but We Can Delay ‘Forever’, Presentation at
:International Solid State Circuits Conference (ISSCC) February 10, 2003, available at
ftp://download.intel.com/research/silicon/Gordon_Moore_ISSCC_021003.pdf.
51

See, e.g., Seth Schiesel, Video on Demand Is Finally Taking Hold, N.Y. Times, Nov.
25, 2002 p. C4; Peter Grant, Miss the Final 'Sopranos'? Getting Cable TV on Demand, Wall.
St. J., Dec. 12, 2002, p. D1.
52

See Wu, supra note 2, at 132–135 (describing peer-to-peer software technologies)

53

See, e.g., Weblogs.

54

See Lessig, Code, supra note 1, at 6.
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cyberspace.55 Software is a constantly-updated regulatory mode; if simply
keeping up is a nontrivial exercise, making meaningful predictions presents an
even greater challenge.
The line of reasoning here is straightforward. As with many innovation
processes, software development is both cumulative—building on what has
already been done56—and revolutionary—moving in sudden ‘leaps ahead.’57
The result is a trendline that advances in alternate periods of steady progress and
paradigm-busting hurdles. Even identifying which phase presently exists is a
challenge: for example, the primary author of the original web browser recently
decried the end of innovation on the world-wide-web.58 And yet the last several
months have shown an explosion of activity surrounding web logs (or blogs) as
an innovative medium of communications,59 as well as the advent of apparentlyviable web-based models of music distribution.60 Similarly, does the music
industry’s recent focus on litigation and legislation (both legal, rather than
software, effects) imply a ‘slow period’ in the implementation of DRM, or are
major advances being made behind the scenes? Further, consider that much
software technology exhibits network effects, which leads to dramatic increases
in impact once a critical level of adoption or deployment is reached.

55

See, e.g., Campbell-Kelly, supra note 50, at 305-06.

56

See, for example, the long-term development of UNIX-type operating systems, now
spanning four decades. See generally Peter H. Salus, A Quarter Century of UNIX (1994);
Lucent Techs., The Creation of the UNIX Operating System, at http://www.belllabs.com/history/unix/;
Apple
Computer,
The
Open
Desktop,
at
http://www.apple.com/macosx/technologies/darwin.html
(describing
the
UNIX
underpinnings of its most modern operating system, Mac OS X).
57

The paradigmatic example here is the 1990s explosion in software development
surrounding the World-Wide-Web and other networking technologies. See, e.g., Tim
Berners-Lee,
Information
Management:
A
Proposal,
March
1989,
at
http://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html (proposing the World-Wide-Web system);
World-Wide-Web Consortium (W3C), A Brief History of the World-Wide-Web, at
http://www.w3.org/History.html
58

Bernhard Warner, Netscape Founder Says Web Browsing Innovation Dead, Reuters,
July 1, 2003.
59

See, e.g., Matthew Rose and Christopher Cooper, Web Logs: Troops' War Stories in
Real Time, Wall St. J., March 25, 2003, at B1; Noah Shachtman, With Incessant Postings, a
Pundit Stirs the Pot, The New York Times, January 16, 2003, p. G5.
60

See, e.g., Sarah McBride, Virgin Group Plans New Venture to Enter Online Music
Business, WALL ST. J., March 8, 2004, at B4 (online music sales estimated at $200 million),
available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56922173. But see John Markoff, New Economy; Apple's
Success with iPod May Presage the Ascendance of Hardware over Software, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2004 (“Apple makes little or no profit from each song downloaded, [but sales of
digital music players] were crucial to Apple's financial resurgence.”)
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That the unpredictably rapid nature of software development poses great
challenges for policy analysis in cyberspace seems quite clear, given its
important regulatory effects.
But perhaps even more critically, this
unpredictability would seem to pose especially acute problems for judicial
actors, who are both quite unlikely to have personal skills related to software
development and seem far less likely than legislatures to have the resources to
become more informed.61 This in turn argues that leaving important cyberspace
policy decisions in the hands of judges is unlikely to be productive.

2. Instability

Another major concern related to software regulation is instability. As
demonstrated above, cyberspace regulation is the product of legal and software
effects; the key analytic factor is the location of the law-software equilibrium
point. And yet, given the rapid developments in software technology, the
stability of such equilibria would appear to be quite temporary.62 For example,
only relatively minor forms of DRM seem to exist presently in the music
context63; one could argue that an equilibrium has been reached, an
accommodation between consumers, commonly-available technology, and the
music creators. But technological advancement could upset this balance,
resulting in greater regulatory effects in the future.64 Indeed, one might expect
that the ongoing process of software development and deployment in the
cyberspace context would tend to increase software effects (and thus overall
regulatory effects) over time.65 These instability effects again suggest that overreliance on software as a significant component of the regulatory infrastructure
is likely to be problematic.

This section has established an analytic framework for the interrelated
regulatory effects of legal and software code, emphasizing both the complex and
61

See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 26, at 15.

62

Absent direct (legal) regulation of software effects

63

See, e.g., Ethan Smith, Can Copyright Be Saved? New Ideas to Make Intellectual
Property Work in the Digital Age, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at R1, available at 2003 WLWSJ 3983145.
64

See, e.g., Steve Pain, MS May Have the Answer to Piracy, BIRMINGHAM POST, Jan.
28, 2003, at P21, available at 2003 WL 7480778 .
65

529.

Lessig appears to share this concern as well. See, e.g. Lessig, Horse, supra note 1, at
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contextual nature of this relationship. The remaining sections, below, apply this
framework to explore both the public effects of software regulation, as well as
its insights into the current controversies over cyberproperty rights.
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III
THE

T H E C A S E A G A I N S T S O F T WA R E :
P U B L IC E F F E C T S O F S O F T WA R E R E G U L AT IO N

If the analytic framework above has made anything clear, it has
demonstrated that policy initiatives in cyberspace demand consideration of both
legal and software effects. That is, if both law and software are regulatory (and
they unambiguously are), and the status of each determines overall regulatory
effects, then an important consideration in any policy analysis is the mixture
between law and software. It is unquestionable that law and software regulate in
different ways; this of course implies that each has different public effects. This
section explores the public effects of regulation by software, informing the
detailed policy analysis required in the cyberspace context.
The picture of public software effects that emerges is troubling, bringing into
sharp relief a number of important concerns about software-based regulation.
Note that these concerns are quite distinct from those identified by Lessig in
Code and Other Law of Cyberspace: while Lessig was essentially concerned
with the identity and motivations of software developers, and the potential for
such developers to undermine important legal-policy values,66 this analysis
focuses squarely on the nature of software as a regulatory mechanism. For even
if one trusts the way regulatory software is developed and deployed, the fact
remains that it sharply differs from law as a mechanism of regulation.67
At least some of these differences suggest that, irrespective of the costeffectiveness calculations explained in connection to Figures 1 and 2 above,
software-as-regulator might have detrimental public effects. That is, even if
software is an effective regulator under particular circumstances, important
public considerations might caution against its overuse. This concern stems
from the nature of software as a regulatory mechanism, especially as compared
to more traditional legal mechanisms. The most important differential features
include the following:
Preprogrammed.

66
67

Software regulation operates in a relatively fixed, rigid

See, e.g., Lessig, Code, supra note 1.

For example, Lessig appears far less concerned about the spread of open-source
developed software code, as it attenuates the ability of private commercial actors (or, indeed,
the government) to meaningfully control it. See id. at 100-109. See also Lessig, Horse,
supra note 1, at 536-539
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fashion to determine regulatory outcomes. The programmed algorithm is
followed without deviation; circumstances outside the scope of the
programmer’s imagination, for example, are not considered. For instance, a
http-referrer link blocking mechanism will block (or allow) designated linking
users, irrespective of various exogenous factors—such as motivation,
willingness to pay for access, and the like.
Narrow range of inputs.
Software regulatory mechanisms use a
predetermined—and typically relatively narrow—range of inputs in
implementing the regulatory rules. Importantly, the quantity, scope and nature
of these inputs are often significantly constrained: by the creativity of the
programmer, the complexity or sophistication of the of the software itself, or the
environment in which it operates. For example the http protocol, which forms
the basis of web-based communications, has a relatively small number of fields
(headers) that offer information about users that would allow for determinations
to be made concerning the authorized use of the network resources.68
Self-contained.
The point here is obvious: Software-implemented
regulations are free-standing mechanisms,69 and do not generally require
recourse to other institutional players for enforcement, rules-determination, etc.
(Contrast this with more typical legal regulation, which generally requires
recourse to other institutions or players—courts, arbitrators, prosecutors,
regulatory bodies—for decision-making related to enforcement.)
Marginally costless. Software regulatory operations are generally unaffected
by the quantity of use.70 A well-designed authentication or link-blocking system
will be able to block a single unwanted request a week, or several per second,
without a substantial difference in performance effects.
Taken together, these features of software regulation may look like just
that—features. Software offers a reliable, unwavering, relatively simple, and at
least potentially inexpensive means to implement regulations. But this view of
software depends upon one’s perspective; mapping a broader, public-oriented
68

Most important among these are the referer (sic) header (which passes information
concerning the location of the link from which the visitor has traveled), as well as headers
directed to authentication (which would only have relevance if the web site was
implementing a password-access system or the like). Note also that the web server would
inherently know the network address of the requesting user. As described in additional
detail below, however, there are relatively simple means to obscure such information.
69

This is not to say that software regulation won’t access external resources, such as
databases, for information or assistance; rather, the observation is that software mechanisms
inherently combine information-collection, rules-analysis, and enforcement.
70

At least to a point: there are of course capacity constraints in any system, the violation
of which can trigger a number of problems.
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view of software regulation reveals a darker side, one that should give pause to
proponents of software. The following sections briefly note these implications.

A. Sof tware and Regul atory Saf ety Valv es

Even under legal schemes that demand little-to-no intervention on the part of
third-party regulatory institutions (property-backed contracts is the paradigmatic
case here) there nonetheless exist a number of what might be called ‘safety
valves’ that serve to ensure that otherwise private arrangements conform to
acknowledged boundaries of social practice. These safety valves can be explicit:
such as unconscionability in contracts (which serves to ensure that agreements
are entered into voluntarily), competition law (which serves to ensure that
private dealings do not stifle the market’s functioning), or even broader social
values, such as antidiscrimination principles. Or they can be less formal, such as
the restraint that is encouraged by the knowledge that enforcement of onerous
contract terms, for example, will often take place in the public sphere—and thus
subject the author to unwanted publicity.
By obviating the need to seek recourse to third party enforcement
institutions—such as courts or regulators—software regulation can, to a
significant degree, “fly under the radar,” avoiding the oversight, both formal and
informal, that occurs even in the least interventionist forms of legal regulation
(such as property-backed contractual relationships). This in turn implies that the
typical forces that, in effect, tend to normalize what otherwise appear to be
purely private dealings, will have substantially less impact where software is
concerned. There are a least two observations that flow from this recognition.
The first is obvious: to the extent that these external constraints on behavior are
highly valued, software then becomes a less attractive regulator. The second is
somewhat more subtle: increased software regulation increases the incidence of
‘outlier’ regulatory techniques—i.e., those that are beyond the range of social
practices.
(An example might be an access-blocking mechanism that
discriminated on the basis of operating system, so as to leverage control from
one market—the web site—to another—operating systems, or one that blocked
users affiliated with particular political views.) Such outlier techniques might be
expected to destabilize the regulatory environment altogether: on the one hand,
it would almost certainly spur further work on anti-regulatory software, thus
leading to greater instability in the law-software interface; on the other, it might
demoralize the user community to a degree that resulted in socially-detrimental
decreases in activity (e.g. web surfing).
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B. Sof tware and the Recogn ition of Enforcem ent Cos ts

It is axiomatic that the enforcement of legal rights won’t occur where the
enforcement costs outweigh the expected gains. While enforcement costs are
often viewed as a social drag, their function of allowing for some (low-level)
violations of rights can in many cases be beneficial. Hence the concept of
“efficient breach” in contract law. This effect of enforcement costs is especially
well-understood in the area of intellectual property, where allowing the broadest
possible dissemination of intellectual creations—consistent with maintaining
appropriate development incentives—is a core value.
In the software regulation context, marginal enforcement costs are
essentially zero. Thus, one can predict with confidence that enforcement costs
will not be accounted for—they don’t exist—and the effects noted above will not
be realized. Again, two implications seem especially relevant. The first is the
loss of the beneficial effects of the recognition of enforcement costs, noted
above. The second is the expectation that the absence of the tempering effect of
enforcement costs will result in more ‘outlier’ regulatory approaches, with
similar instability and demoralization potential as with the absence of the safety
valves.

C. Sca ling S oftware

As a general matter, software scales well—its behavioral features remain
unchanged as the quantity of activity increases. As a regulatory mechanism, this
might appear quite attractive; a common problem in legal regulation is
overloading of the institutions that provide the regulatory functions. And yet,
the scaling features of software may have potentially-troubling public effects as
well. For one thing, software regulation is likely to become increasingly
vulnerable to countermeasures as the scale of its use increases71; it is wellestablished that popular or widely-used software most encourages the sort of
research that would either reveal latent bugs in the software, or develop effective

71

This situation is exacerbated by an institutional tendency to under-report potential
defects at the performance-testing stage prior to release. See, e.g., Lisa Liberty Becker,
Telling the Truth Can Be Hazardous to Your Job, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2003, at G9,
available at 2003 WL 3389786; H. Jeff Smith & Mark Keil, The Reluctance to Report Bad
News on Troubled Software Projects: A Theoretical Model, 13 Info. Systems J. 69 (2003).
See generally NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. D EPT. OF COMMERCE, THE
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF INADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SOFTWARE TESTING (May 2002).
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countermeasures.72 And software regulation is unlikely to fail gracefully: once
bugs or countermeasures are discovered, the effectiveness of the particular
regulatory mechanism is substantially diminished.73 This phenomena—that
software becomes increasingly vulnerable to sudden (even catastrophic) failure
as its scale increases—again suggests that software is an unstable regulatory
device.
Other implications of the scaling features of software are similar to those
noted with respect to safety valves and enforcement costs: the loss of a
tempering effect that serves to diminish the incidence of outlier or ‘extreme’
private regulatory forms (i.e., terms in contractual relationships). If the costs of
a regulatory choice—a particular contract term—increased with scale, one might
expect this fact to tend to ‘smooth out’ terms that disproportionately generated
controversy or, more significantly, enforcement costs. Including a contractual
term requiring users to avoid criticizing the web site owner, for example, might
simply cause more trouble that it’s worth, especially as the number of
agreements rises rapidly.74 But in the software regulation context, the ability of
software to scale “well” means that these potentially-beneficial scaling effects
are absent.
Taken together, the pattern of public-related concerns about software

72

See, e.g., Christopher Jones, Internet Hacking for Dummies, WIRED MAGAZINE (Feb.
20, 1998), available at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,10459,00.html.
Eric Raymond famously made a similar point in the context of the open source
movement, noting that "[g]iven enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow." Eric Raymond, The
Cathedral and the Bazaar, in THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 19, 30 (2001). See also Yochai Benkler,
Coase's Penguin, Or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369, 434-36 (2002).
73

See, e.g., Building a Better Bug Trap, THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 2003, available at
2003 WL 5852981; Dan Verton, Tech Consortium Created to Improve Software Reliability,
COMPUTERWORLD, May 20, 2002, at 12. See generally NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND
TECH., supra note 71.
Additionally, efforts to repair vulnerable or defective software systems are typically
problematic. See,
e.g.,
Douglas Schweitzer,
Emerging
Technology:
Patch
Management—Patch Me If You Can!, NETWORK MAG. (Aug. 1, 2003) (software patches are
generally expensive to install on large networks, frequently get released with minimal
testing, and often have unintended consequences—such as causing other programs to crash),
available at 2003 WL 5398725; George V. Hulme, Companies Pay Up to Plug Holes,
INFORMATIONWEEK (May 20, 2002) (hackers outpace the repair efforts of security
administrators),
at
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=6502382.
74

See, e.g., Ed Foster, A Punitive Puppeteer?, INFOWORLD (Sept. 14, 2001), at
http://archive.infoworld.com/articles/op/xml/01/09/17/010917opfoster.xml
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regulation suggests that, as compared to more traditional legal regulatory
mechanisms, software is likely to be considerably less stable, as well as contain
a higher incidence of “outlier” or “extreme” rules. These concerns need to be
factored into any policy analysis in cyberspace, and suggest that software
regulation may be considerably less attractive than it might otherwise appear.
This is not to suggest that software regulation should be excised as a policy
option: indeed, this would seem next to impossible in the cyberspace context.
Instead, this argues for a more nuanced view of the trade-offs between legal code
and software code.

S O F T WA R E

AND THE

IV
CHOICE

OF

LEGA L RULE S

The preceding two Sections have demonstrated both the importance of
understanding the law-software relationship in the cyberspace context, and how
the very different ways that law and software regulate may argue rather
forcefully in favor of predominantly legal rather than software-based regulatory
approaches. In essence, a better law-software equilibrium is likely to have more
law and less software.
This Section explores the implications of the foregoing analysis for the
selection of forms of legal rules in cyberspace. That is, proceeding from the
premise that the most convenient policy lever available to affect regulatory
conditions in cyberspace is law, rather than software, the analysis now turns to
the way that the choice of legal rule is influenced by considerations of the lawsoftware equilibrium.75
A key observation here is that the choice of legal rules in cyberspace is not
just an argument between the classic dichotomy of “property rules” and “liability
rules” (and mixtures thereof) but also between traditional legal forms and those
that directly impact the scope and quantity of software regulation—forms of
legal rules denoted here as legal preemption.76 That is, given the analysis in
75

As Tim Wu importantly suggests, some groups may find software to be a more
convenient approach to altering the regulatory landscape. See generally Wu, supra note 2
(describing peer-to-peer file sharing software as an effort to affect the regulatory
environment for copyrighted works). For purposes here, however, the analysis considers the
more typical policy lever of legal regulation.
76

The description of property rules and liability rules as defining the basic forms of
legal rules was established in Calabresi and Melamed’s seminal article, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, supra note 24.
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Sections II and III, the choice of legal rule in this context has a traditional
normative component (i.e., Which form of legal rule provides the best/most
efficient regulatory mechanism?), and a distinctly instrumental component (i.e.,
Which form of legal rule most effectively influences the law-software
equilibrium?). Analyzing the rule-forms in this light suggests that the real
choice of legal rule in cyberlaw regulation is between (a) relatively strong
property rules and (b) rules consisting of significant forms of legal preemption;
absent the support of legal preemption, liability rules appear to be significantly
less attractive. As between these choices, any generalizable conclusion is
relatively tentative, recognizing the deeply contextual nature of any regulatory
undertaking in cyberspace. There is at least some reason to believe, however,
that in a broad array of cases, a property rule will outperform those based on
stronger forms of legal preemption.

A. Prope rty Rul es, Lia bility Rul es, and Legal Preem ption

In any evaluation concerning forms of legal regulation, it is customary to
discuss the issue in terms of two basic forms of legal rules: property rules and
liability rules.77 A property rule grants the rightsholder (the ‘property owner’)
the right to enjoin unwanted uses, and thus forces bargaining between owners
and users to determine the details of the use (such as price, terms of use, etc.).78
For example, in the cyberproperty context, a property rule establishes the basic
right of web developers to determine access—and presumes that contractual
arrangements would define the details of such access. A liability rule, by
contrast, defines much of the details of the arrangement—typically allowing use
except where certain defined harms occur, whereupon a remedy (usually
monetary) will be granted.79 Again, in the cyberproperty context, a liability rule
would grant access, subject to harmful acts that would trigger liability—for

77

See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich L. Rev.
1, 3 (2002) (“The Calabresi-Melamedian typology has been widely understood to exhaust all
possible ways of protecting legal entitlements, and the binary system they devised has
dominated legal thought and scholarship.”). See also Robert P. Merges, Contracting into
Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal. L.
Rev. 1293 (1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:
An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1996); Symposium, Property Rules, Liability
Rules and Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 Yale L.J. 2081 (1997).
78

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note supra note 24 at 1092.

79

Id.
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example, extreme overuse of bandwidth,80 or forms of linking bordering on
misappropriation.81
It is widely argued that, following Cosean reasoning, property rules are
better suited for circumstances where cost-effective bargaining is
possible—because they are more likely to result in welfare-enhancing
arrangements than liability rules.82 However, where transaction costs are high,
or bargaining is not possible, liability rules are the better choice.83
Yet the binary choice of legal rule-form is fundamentally incomplete in the
cyberlaw context.84 This observation follows from the basic code-meets-law
point noted above, and is the same reason that simply establishing a legal rule
does not necessarily determine (and may not even predict) the regulatory
condition that results—both law and software regulate in cyberspace, and both
must be accounted for in the analytic approach.85 Thus, the choice of legal form
must contain an additional dimension, one that recognizes and reflects the
crucial interactions between law and software.
One way this additional dimension takes form is by the inclusion of a third
form of legal rule—described here as legal preemption, that directly addresses
the regulatory effects of software.86 Legal preemption, then, has as its goal the
fixing (at least within a narrow range) of the equilibrium point on the lawsoftware interface, and thus allowing—at least in theory—greater predictability
and stability in the software component of the overall regulatory condition.

80

Perhaps by knowingly triggering the “slashdot effect,” a spontaneous high hit rate
upon a web server due to posting links to its content on a high-volume news site, named
after the web site slashdot.org. See, e.g., Stephen Adler, The Slashdot Effect: An Analysis
of Three Publications, at http://ssadler.phy.bnl.gov/adler/SDE/SlashDotEffect.html The
Slashdot effect has been known to cause web servers to become unreachable or to crash
altogether.
81

For example, inline linking of others image, see Kelly v ArribaSoft, or the framing of
content (displaying content from another site in a ‘frame’ in a web page such that it appears
to be a part from the local site).
82

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24, at 1108-10.

83

Id.

84

Bell and Parchomovsky have posited that the analysis is incomplete in other contexts
as well, and that a variety of ‘mixed’ or ‘dynamic’ versions of property rules and liability
rules exist—which they describe as ‘pliability rules.” See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note
77, at 4. To some degree, the hybrid forms of traditional legal rule-forms and legal
preemption described here are related to their concept of pliability rules.
85
86

See supra Section II.

Lessig describes this phenomenon as “law regulating code”. Lessig, Horse, supra
note 1, at 530-32.
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There are several possible forms of this regulatory technique, ranging
generally from strong forms to weaker versions. The strongest approach is what
might be described as a direct form, where the legal code directly establishes
formal boundaries or requirements for software code. For example, the Audio
Home Recording Act defines the permissible workings of hardware-andsoftware “digital audio recording devices,” specifying that the software will
implement a copyright management system, known as the Serial Copy
Management System.87 Other examples include the ongoing legislative and
regulatory proposals requiring a “broadcast flag” to be included in the signal for
digital television, so as to allow for the operation of copy management
software.88
Another, somewhat less strong form is regulatory standardization, where
legal regulations establish the framework within which software will operate.
For example, the FCC has established (repeatedly) the technical standards for
digital television (HDTV).89 While not directly mandating the particulars of the
software, establishing the standards will of course greatly reduce the variability
of the technologies used.
A weaker-but-related version of equilibrium enforcement is legal regulation
that supports software-as-regulator—the paradigmatic example here being the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which generally forbids the
distribution of technologies that allow circumvention of DRM systems
protecting copyrighted works.90 In the analytic framework established by this
paper, these supportive regulations serve to stabilize the law-software
equilibrium point, by reducing the incidence of at least some forms of antiregulatory code.91 Note that, perhaps counter-intuitively (but relevantly to the
analysis here), this form of regulation may serve to actually reduce the
regulatory effects of software: once the level of software protection required to
trigger the supportive law (for example, the DMCA describes this as
“effective[]” protection)92 is reached, there will be diminished incentives to seek
stronger software effects, given that no additional legal protection will be

87

See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2002).

88

Amy Harmon, Hearings Set On Measure To Promote Digital TV, The New York
Times, September 25, 2002, p. C7.
89

Edmund L. Andrews And Joel Brinkley, The Fight for Digital TV's Future, The New
York Times , January 22, 1995, p. C1.
90

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2002).

91

See Wu, supra note 2, at 132-35 (describing the effects of anti-regulatory code in
changing the regulatory condition for copyrighted goods).
92

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2002)
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achieved, and the incidence of anti-regulatory code will be reduced.
A fourth—and perhaps weakest—form of legal preemption would be legal
rules that specify the use of particular software in a transactional rather than
regulatory manner. For example, consider a legal requirement that transactions
concerning privacy utilized the P3P standard,93 or that web pages were to be
tagged according to the PICS standard, to allow for content filtering and
selection:94 each has a comparatively small regulatory component, their chief
aim being to establish a transactional framework.95
Table 1 summarizes the spectrum of legal preemption.

Strong Forms

Weak Forms

Direct

Standardization

Support

Transactional

AHRA

FCC activities

DMCA

P3P or PICS
mandate

Table 1: Forms of Legal Preemption Rules

As should be apparent, the above categories are neither exhaustive nor
mutually-exclusive. Indeed, many forms of legal preemption rules will involve a
mixture of the above. As will be discussed more fully below, however, the form
of the legal preemption rule has important implications for the analysis.
The broader point, however, is this: just as the choice of a legal rule will
involve analytic trade-offs between the familiar categories of property rules and

93

P3P is the acronym for the Platform for Privacy Preferences, a technical standard
developed to enhance the ability of users to determine the use of their personal information
online. See World-Wide-Web Consortium, Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project,
at http://www.w3.org/P3P/.
94

PICS stands for the Platform for Internet Content Selection, a technical standard for
associating labels with web content. One promising use of PICS is as a means for filtering
web content for children and minors, though the standard is not so limited. See WorldWide-Web Consortium, Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS), at
http://www.w3.org/PICS/. For a detailed discussion of the possibilities and challenges
(including constitutional) of forms of a mandatory PICS scheme, see generally R. Polk
Wagner, Filters & the First Amendment, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 755 (1999).
95

Of course, as any lawyer will note, even transaction/procedural rules have substantive
effects; thus transactional forms of legal preemption rules will clearly have some regulatory
effects. The point here is to try to tease out some general distinctions for more fine-grained
policy analysis.
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liability rules, the incorporation of legal preemption rules in the cyberspace
context will require a similar exercise along an additional dimension—the
impact that the legal rule will have on corresponding software regulation (and
thus the effect on the law-software interface).
Figure 3 depicts this multidimensional analysis.

Figure 3: The Dimensions of the Choice of Legal Rule

Point a in Figure 4 represents a possible analytic location of a legal rule,
containing a combination of features from liability rules, property rules, and
legal preemption rules. Any choice of a legal rule in cyberspace will have this
form of multidimensional analysis; both axes of regulatory choice will impact
the quality and nature of the legal effect.

B. Cho osing the For m I: Normat ive Ana lysis

Having identified the dimensions along which the analysis must take place,
the next step is to comparatively evaluate the benefits of a choice of legal ruleform. Here again there is an important complication in the cyberlaw context:
because the policy lever of the legal rule must be understood (given Sections II

[ August 25, 2004

WAGNER | SOFTWARE REGULATION

32 ]

and III above) as operating both to establish a legal regulatory effect (i.e.,
protection or entitlement) and to generate a software-regulatory response, the
choice-of-form analysis includes both normative and instrumental components.96
The normative component is well understood: Which legal rule is likely to best
provide the desired legal effects.97 The instrumental component considers the
legal rule in the context of its impact on software regulation, and asks which rule
form is likely to be more effective at influencing the software response. Each of
these evaluations must of course be conducted for each dimension of regulation
(see Figure 3)—property versus liability rules, and strength of legal preemption.

1. Property versus liability rules

The first step is to re-evaluate property rules and liability rules from a
perspective that reveals their relationship with software regulations. The intent
here is not to restate the standard set of competing advantages and disadvantages
of the property rule versus liability rule debate.98 Instead, the analysis focuses
on those factors which appear to take on heightened relevance in the cyberlaw
context, and evaluates how these play out. Thus, to a degree, the analysis here is
relative—noting changes in the analysis due to the special regulatory
environment of cyberspace.
As noted above, regulatory environments featuring software content are
generally characterized by dynamic changes in the regulatory environment (as a
result of technological changes), and very complex interactions between the
legal rules and software techniques.99 This suggests that three factors in
particular are especially relevant. First, the flexibility accorded to the parties
involved, both to assist innovation in the dynamic environment, and, more
importantly, to respond to changes in the regulatory condition. As was described
in Section II above, the ability to dynamically respond to changing conditions is
important to stability in the regulatory environment. More flexibility is likely to
be far better in this context.
Second, the level of routine institutional intervention—the participation of
the judiciary or regulatory agencies, for example—is important. In a rapidlydeveloping and complex regulatory environment, there are potentially-

96

See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.

97

See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24, at 1105

98

See, e.g., id. at 1101.

99

See supra notes 44-48and accompanying text.
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significant costs in uncertainty and errors resulting from additional (and
customary) institutional intervention.100
A third factor is the responsiveness of any legal rule. As was described
above, changes in the software regulatory context can dramatically alter the
overall regulatory condition.101 Hence the ability to change the effects of a legal
rule is important; more responsive legal rules are far more likely to be beneficial.
Two additional factors seem quite relevant to the analysis here, given the
cyberlaw context. The first is transaction costs, which are of course a generic
concern related to legal rules.102 And yet the great scale of the online
environment suggests that transaction costs deserve heightened attention here;
any change in transaction costs as a result of reliance on a property-type rule is
likely to be significant, due to the huge multiplier effect of the number of
transactions conducted (or potentially conducted) online.
The last (but not least) relevant factor is the question of embedding public
values—such as free speech, diversity of opinion, privacy, etc.—into the
regulatory construct.103 Like transaction costs, this issue is typical of many
choice of legal-rule analyses; the question here is whether it is especially
relevant in the online world. Larry Lessig, among others, has forcefully argued
in the affirmative: on the general grounds that the Internet (and related
technologies) offers society a great opportunity to expand our social structures,
to enhance diversity, expression, and individualism.104 And while there is at
least some doubt as to its heightened import in the cyberlaw context, this is a
widely-held view, and thus should be included in the analytic process.105 Here, a

100

See supra notes 61 and accompanying text. See also McGowan, supra note 26, at

101

See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.

16.

102

See, e.g, Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24, at 1103; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 77, at 4.
103

See, e.g., Lessig, Horse, supra note 1.

104

See, e.g., Lessig, Code, supra note 1, at 8. See also Elkin-Koren, supra note 26;
O’Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 26, at 1978.
105

The counterarguments take one of two forms. The first is to question the premise of
Internet exceptionalism that underlies many arguments related to the great public import of
the Internet. Surely the ‘net is very important, the argument goes; but then again so are a
huge variety of realspace regulatory environments—many of which might arguably be said
to have a more direct impact on most people’s lives (i.e., equality, social entitlements). See,
e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 8; Goldsmith, supra note 8.
The second response generally accepts the Internet exceptionalism premise, and yet
suggests that the best way to ensure that its potential is maximized is to largely leave the
decisions in the hands of private individuals. That is, this response emphasizes that much (if
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liability rule, by allowing more control over the arrangements, will allow more
public values to be reflected in the regulatory environment.
Table 2 maps these factors onto the features of property and liability rules,
describing in relative terms the rules’ performance related to each factor.

Rule Form

Flexibility

Institutional
Intervention

Response Time

Transaction
Costs

Embedding
Public Values

Pr op er ty Rule

High

Low

High

High

Low

Li ab il ity R ule

Low

High

Low

Low

High

Table 2: Features of Property versus Liability Rules

Whether one is convinced that the results displayed in Table 2 point strongly
(or at all) in the direction of a particular form of legal rules will depend largely
upon a (normative) judgment about the relative importance of each factor. In
this sense, of course, the analytic process is much like a more traditional choice
of legal rule-form.106 Yet the value of setting forth the process goes beyond that,
for two reasons. First, recall that such analytic approaches are deeply
contextual; thus in any particular application (i.e., regulatory issue), certain
factors may be deemed more important than others. For example, the argument
in Section V below posits that in the cyberproperty context, allowing great
flexibility in setting access conditions is particularly important to continued
innovation on the World Wide Web; thus a property rule might be said to be at
least weakly favored by this analysis.107
The second important insight is that simply understanding the respective
strengths and weaknesses can suggest to policymakers ways of combining, for
example, property rules and legal preemption. For example, the results in Table
2 suggest the value of considering a hybrid property rule and a legal preemption
rule directed to enabling transactions—thereby reducing a disadvantage of the
property rule-form.

not most) of the explosion related to the ‘net is the result of private decision-making
(sometimes, but not always motivated by profit), and that absent serious indicators
otherwise, government interference should be minimized. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner,
Information Wants to be Free, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 995 (2003).
106

See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24, at 1103.

107

See infra notes 147-157 and accompanying text.
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2. Strength of legal preemption

As noted above, a rule of legal preemption has as its goal the fixing (or
influencing, in weaker form) the corresponding regulatory effects of software.108
Therefore, the series of concerns raised about the use of software as a regulatory
mechanism do suggest that legal preemption rules offer at least potentiallyattractive options. Indeed, this is the chief advantage of a legal preemption rule,
and it is likely to be significant. This enthusiasm, however, should be tempered
by a recognition of limitations that seem inherent in any such regulatory
approach. The analysis that follows suggests three considerations: the difficulty
in directly addressing software in legal regulations; the increased cost of error
inherent in any legal preemption scheme; and concerns about institutional
competence.
Consistent with the points made in Section II above, software development is
a rapidly moving, nearly unpredictable target—making legal regulations that
directly address software difficult indeed.109 Not impossible, certainly, but quite
difficult as a technical matter; as noted above, the precise details of the lawsoftware interface are deeply complex, and attempting to codify those in any
meaningful way is clearly a nontrivial exercise.
Following from the difficulty point, note that the costs of error in engaging
in direct regulation of software effects could be far more significant than the
error involved in setting legal regulation alone. For example, a too-low level of
legal protection in the cyberspace context may be partially overcome by the
effects of software regulation. However, the combination of both too little law
and direct software regulation (of the preemption form, perhaps) would be far
more problematic. To take another example, serious problems could arise if the
legal regulation encompassed more forms of software than intended, thus
resulting in potentially-serious unintended consequences. Indeed, this is an oftheard criticism of the DMCA—that its scope is such as to encompass business
practices110 and even bona fide research111 well afield from the support of basic
108

See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.

109

See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.

110

See, e .g., Dan L. Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L.REV. 1095, 1110-14
(2003).
111

See, e.g., David P. Hamilton, Professor Savors Being in Thick of Internet Rows,
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2001, at B1; Jennifer 8. Lee, In Digital Copyright Case, Programmer
Can Go Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at C4; Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne
Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575, 1646-49
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DRM systems. Errors when seeking to directly regulate the law-software
interface could be quite serious.
Finally, though not entirely unrelatedly, the question of direct regulation of
software raises questions of institutional competence. As was noted above, there
are reasons to think that judges in particular are not well-suited to engage in
meaningful software-regulatory-policy analyses. Legislatures or regulatory
bodies might have a better chance, but the rapid developing environment
suggests that any move to take the path and pace of software development away
from private decision-makers is one that must viewed skeptically. There are
likely to be conditions where this approach nonetheless makes sense, but the
point here is that great care must be taken in this direction.
Note of course that, as noted above, the various forms of legal preemption
rules raise differential concerns—as a general matter, the less strong, less
interventionist forms of legal preemption are less likely to have the problematic
side-effects. In any event, it does seem clear that despite the limitations, legal
preemption rules would be consistent, at least in some circumstances, with the
analytic framework developed here. Their suitability in any particular case, of
course, is dependent on a variety of contextual factors, as well as the balance of
the normative and instrumental analysis.

C. Cho osing the For m II: Instr umenta l Ana lysis

The instrumental analysis of the choice of legal rule-forms is primarily
concerned with the effectiveness of the rule in influencing the location of the
law-software equilibrium. That is, legal rules in the cyberspace context serve
both to establish legal effects and to influence the corresponding softwareregulatory effects. Indeed, as Section III demonstrated, there is good reason to
believe that in many cases, a major goal of the legal regulation will be to affect
software regulation—usually by reducing it. The following section steps
through the analysis of the instrumental effects of the choice of legal rule.

1. Property versus liability rules

As noted in Section II above, absent direct regulatory effects (legal
preemption), the law-software equilibrium for a particular regulatory condition

(2002).
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is generally determined by private decision-making related to the cost-benefits
of each regulatory effect (law and software). Thus, to influence the law-software
equilibrium, a (non-preemptive) legal rule must provide an attractive alternative
to regulation-by-software.
As between a property rule and a liability rule, there are at least two reasons
to believe that the property rule will more effectively influence the law-software
equilibrium. The first is the potential strength of the legal effects: a reasonablybroad property rule will allow rightsholders the ability to set restrictive
conditions for access—even quite stringent ones—without the need to resort to
software regulation. A liability rule, by definition, is more conditional in nature;
it will have less potential legal effects, and thus a weaker influence on the
quantum of software effects. Put more directly, because a liability rule offers
less potential protection (legal effects) to rightsholders, it is less likely to
discourage the use of software regulations.
The second important reason a property rule is likely to more significantly
influence the law-software equilibrium is its flexibility.
By allowing
rightsholders to structure access in virtually infinite ways, a property rule is
likely to provide important benefits over regulation-by-software—which, as
noted in Section III above, is, as a general matter, relatively inflexible.112
Here, both the potential strength of the legal effects and the flexibility in
arranging rights suggest rather strongly that a property rule clearly dominates the
liability rule in an instrumental analysis. Indeed, the key feature of the liability
rule—fixed legal effects—would seem to call into serious question the rule’s
ability to have significant instrumental effects at all. By fixing legal effects, a
liability rule will almost definitionally be an unattractive alternative to software
regulation, which offers at least some flexibility—albeit far less than a propertytype legal rule. So it may be that in instrumental terms, a liability rule, standing
alone, is virtually no option at all. (Note, of course, that a liability rule coupled
with legal preemption will certainly have significant effects on the law-software
equilibrium.)

2. Strength of legal preemption

In considering the instrumental effect of legal rules—the effectiveness of the
influence a legal rule is likely to have over the law-software equilibrium–the
advantage is manifest: a rule including legal preemption will (by definition) have
112

See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 26, at 84 (noting the particularization and
standardization achievable in contractual agreements); McGowan, supra note 26 at 30.
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significant effects on the law-software interface. Depending upon the level of
intervention, these effects can range from almost complete determination of
software regulations to indirect encouragement.
There are, of course, at least potentially-significant downsides. First, and
most obviously, legal preemption requires a trade-off between the advantages
inherent in software regulation—especially flexibility—and the effectiveness of
the rule in fixing the law-software interface. That is, strong forms of legal
preemption (banning certain technologies, for example) will have great effects,
but they will also remove an important component of regulatory flexibility from
the system altogether. Weaker forms of legal preemption, of course, will not
remove all such flexibility—but they will also have more attenuated effects.
A second important concern, though related to the first, is that the use of
legal preemption increases the costs of error inherent in regulatory decisionmaking. That is, assume for the moment two legal rules in the cyberspace
environment, each establishing the same legal effects X (i.e., the same amount of
legal protection): the first is a traditional legal rule (i.e., one without
preemption); the second is a rule including strong legal preemption aspects. If
the quantum of legal effects X is somehow inappropriate or in error—perhaps
the protection is too weak to support the development desired, or is over-strong,
given public policy considerations—then we can expect the regulatory
environment in the first case to adapt to at least some degree, by using additional
software regulation to complement the legal regulation. The result will be that
the cost of error is likely to be reduced, at least somewhat. But in the second
case, the legal preemption will restrict or eliminate this adjustment, so the error
is likely to be more costly. In other words, introducing legal preemption in
effect ‘raises the stakes’ of the policy judgment, and thus increases the chances
for costly (or even enormously costly) errors.

D. Cho osing the Leg al Rul e in Cyb erspac e

This section has outlined the implications of incorporating a more
meaningful understanding of the regulatory effects of software into the choice of
a legal rule for cyberspace regulation. Such effects can be (and, indeed, must
be) accounted for, but the analytic process is unquestionably more complicated.
In particular, the foregoing suggests that the traditional dichotomy between
property and liability rules must be expanded to include rule forms that directly
effect the quantity and nature of software regulation—legal preemption. This
implies that the choice of rule-form occurs in two dimensions: a choice not only
between property rules and liability rules, but also between legal preemption
rules and more pure legal forms.
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Another key finding here is that the decision-making criteria must also be
expanded to incorporate the instrumental effect of legal rules—the effectiveness
with which the rule influences the law-software equilibrium. Indeed, if one
agrees with the analysis in Section II above, that in many cases software
regulation is a poor substitute for legal regulation, this instrumental performance
may be as important as the more traditional normative analysis of the ‘goodness’
of a legal rule-form.
Although the choice of legal rule-form here is revealed to be deeply complex
and contextually dependent upon legal and technological circumstances, there
are a few general observations that spring forth. The first is that what might be
called
‘naked’
liability
rules—those
without
aspects
of
legal
preemption—appear to be markedly less suitable for cyberspace regulation than
either ‘naked’ property rules, or liability rules with some significant support
from legal preemption rules. This might suggest that: (1) the real choice of ruleforms in the cyberspace context is between property rules and hybrid liabilitylegal preemption rules; and (2) that legal preemption rules are particularly
interesting as policy options. The second general observation is the ability to
mix forms of traditional legal rules (property rules, liability rules) with forms of
legal preemption rules. In particular, consider the ability to use a property rule
combined with, for example, a transactional form of a legal preemption
rule—thereby addressing the concern about transaction costs that attached to
property rules. In addition, such hybrid rules suggest that careful policy analysis
can tailor legal-rule forms to address quite closely the particulars of a given
regulatory context in cyberspace.
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V
C Y B E R P R O P E RT Y

This Section follows from the prior three, by applying the foregoing analysis
to one of the more controversial regulatory issues in this area: cyberproperty. As
used here, a “cyberproperty” right is generally a right to exclude others from
access to network-connected resources.113 That is, a cyberproperty right will
allow owners to determine the details of the use of, for example, their web sites,
email systems, and the like. Paradigmatically, the cyberproperty right would
include a right to deny http ‘links’ to the web site from another’s web page.
So defined, the cyberproperty right analyzed in this section is intended to
conceptually encompass a range of emerging and related legal actions, each with
different doctrinal foundations.114 This range of doctrinal approaches, along
with a few of their important features and regulatory effects, are described
briefly below. However, the goal of this Section is not to engage in the sort of
detailed doctrinal analysis that has been an important part of earlier
contributions, nor even to suggest doctrinal ‘fixes’ to better establish the
cyberproperty right. Instead, the purpose here is to use the regulatory confusion
surrounding this important question as a hook upon which to hang a broader
form of policy analysis, following the lessons of the Sections above.

113

I recognize that the invocation of the term ‘property’ here suggests an analogical
connection between access protections online and those in realspace—i.e., real ‘property’.
As should become clear below, however, this analysis does not place weight on real property
premises.
114

Table _ below notes the variety of (legal) sources from which the cyberproperty
entitlement might be said to emanate. Taken collectively, these recent legal developments
represent a penumbra of rights surrounding the issue of access to network-connected
resources; the term cyberproperty is used both as a shorthand for these developments, as
well as a means by which the detailed doctrinal controversies can be laid aside in favor of
broader analytic work.
There exist several important works considering the general issue of cyberproperty.
See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (2003); David McGowan,
Website Access: The Case for Consent, __ Loy-Chi. L. J. __ (forthcoming 2003); Trotter
Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Websites, 1996 J. Online L. art. 7; Dan L. Burk,
The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. Law 27 (2000); Nina Elkin-Koren,
Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude Indexing, 49 J.
copyright Soc’y 165 (2001); Maureen O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the
Internet: In Search of An Appropriate Analogy, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 561 (2001); Maureen
O’Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet; Who Owns Product and Pricing
Information?, 53 Van. L. Rev. 1965 (2000).
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It is clear that, whatever the current state of cyberproperty, rights of access in
cyberspace is a hotly-contested issue. The trespass to chattels approach to this
issue in particular has been hotly contested among legal scholars
recently—especially doctrinally 115—though similar concerns have been noted
with respect to the other approaches as well. Normatively, the emergence of
cyberproperty has led scholars to declare the imminent demise (in early 2000) of
search engines,116 as well as to describe the current state of affairs as “nothing
short of disastrous for public policy.”117 Others take a more sanguine view,
arguing that the intellectual tradition (and widespread success) of real property
entitlements suggest that these developments are likely to be socially beneficial,
in part by facilitating the bargaining (and thus diversity of arrangements) that is
essential to continued growth of the Internet.118
The analysis in this section begins by noting that the regulatory
environment—both law and software—for the cyberproperty right is complex,
uncertain, and unstable, suggesting that policy changes are necessary and
appropriate. The analysis then considers the appropriate content of the lawsoftware interface, by mapping the key policy imperatives onto the present
technological realities. These factors include:
(a) the fact that the vast majority of online resources are offered
in a “full access” condition, and that therefore a relatively
small number of owners should be expected to opt for the
more nuanced “conditional access” modes that a
cyberproperty right allows;
(b) the need for flexibility in structuring online information
delivery and business models;
(c) a recognition of the important public good aspects of open
access to network resources; and
(d) the benefits of establishing a clear and stable regulatory
regime;
In each case, the analysis suggests that the regulatory condition for
cyberproperty should contain more law and less software. Furthermore, the
choice of legal rule is also informed by this framework; a detailed understanding
115

See, e.g., Dan Burk, supra note 26; O’Rourke, Analogy, supra note 26.

116

See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc. at 2- 3, eBay v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00- 15995), available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/amicus/biddersedge_v_ebay.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
117

Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 521, 523 (2003).

118

See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 26; Epstein, supra note 26.
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of the relationship between law and software argues, with at least some force, in
the direction of a property rule rather than a liability rule, and there is some
support for the imposition of legal preemption rules as well. Indeed, an
interesting result that emerges from the analysis is the possibility of a hybrid
form of rule: one that combines a fairly strong property rule, with a default
condition in favor of open access, and encourages software techniques to
implement transactional forms.
Note that for simplicity, the analytic discussion that follows will be
considering the cyberproperty right in terms of its specific application to the
World Wide Web—that is, access to web sites / servers. Similar analyses would
be followed for related applications involving other network-connected
resources, such as email systems, for example.

A. The Legal -Software Lan dscape of Cyb erprope rty

Consistent with the analytic framework developed in Section II this article,
this part notes the present state of regulatory conditions—both law and
software—in the cyberproperty context. As noted above, the cyberproperty right
is at least partially supported by several legal doctrines, ranging from trespass
law to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).119 Table 3 outlines the basic
features of these doctrinal hooks, and considers the scope of their legal effects.

Doctrine

Protection

Key Case

Trespass to Chattels

Unauthorized access to
physical servers

eBay v. Bidder’s Edge120

Copyright Law

May protect certain
forms of ‘inline’ linking

Kelly v Arriba Soft121

(Naked) Contract Law

Implements ‘Terms of
Service Agreements’
posted on page

Register.com v Verio122

Regulatory Effects
Medium: Relatively strong,
though doctrinal uncertainty
concerning damages.
Unclear: serious questions
of applicability to this
context; fair use defenses
exist
Medium: limited to web
pages, etc.; some
uncertainty about consent

119

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2002).

120

eBay, Inc. v Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 1058 (ND Cal. 2000).

121

Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion withdrawn by Kelly
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13557 (9th Cir. Cal., July 7, 2003).
122

Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (SDNY 2000).
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Unauthorized intrusion
into computer systems.

Register.com v Verio123
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Medium: Potentially strong,
though intended to prevent
hacking; mental state
requirement

Table 3: The Legal Environment for Cyberproperty

As Table 3 demonstrates, a legal infrastructure of the cyberproperty right
exists, but its net effects are far from clear. In particular, note the relatively high
degree of uncertainty about the scope of the regulatory effects; as applied to this
issue, each doctrinal approach includes significant conceptual analytic
difficulties, which tend to both reduce the net regulatory effects, as well as
increase the instability and uncertainty of the legal framework.
Table 3, then, by demonstrating the deeply unclear nature of the
cyberproperty entitlement, provides a hook by which to begin the policy
analysis.
Next, Table 4 sets forth the software-regulatory framework. (Note that this
table looks specifically at access to web servers; the options for controlling
access to other network resources are even more limited.)

Technology

Complexity

http_referer
(Javascript)

High: requires CGI
development/
software installation &
configuration on
server
Low: simple one-line
code in html
document

Cookie
redirection125

Medium: requires
either CGI scripting or
complex javascript

http_referer
(server-side)124

123

Effectiveness

Flexibility

Regulatory Effects

Low: obscuring
referrer header
avoids it

Low: considers only
referring page

Low: Depends upon
default
implementation

Low: obscuring
referrer header
avoids it

Low: considers only
referring page

Low: Depends upon
default
implementation

Low: cookie rejection
is typical

Medium: cookies offer
flexibility in
information, but this
generally requires
prior visits

Medium

Id.

124

See, e.g., Exceptional Digital Enterprise Solutions, Inc., HotLinkStop, at
http://xde.net/xq/tool.hotlinkstop/qx/index.htm; Simson Garfinkel, Web Security &
Commerce 293-309 (1997).
125

See,
e.g.,
PerlscriptsJavascripts.com,
Redirection
http://www.perlscriptsjavascripts.com/js/cookie_redirect.html.

Cookie,

at
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Robot Exclusion
Standard126

Low: simple text file
at root of server

Medium:
unenforced/voluntary,
works only for robots

Low: only ‘bots, only
deny/allow entire
directories

Low

Authentication
(password
protection)127

Very High: requires
both substantial code
and user management

High: denies access to
all except those
authorized

Variable: individual
users can be given
differential access

Medium: very
effective, but only
appropriate in limited
circumstances

High: requires
database-based
site/server software
installations

Medium: prevents
linking/bookmarking,
but access unimpeded

Low: causes
potentially-serious
difficulties for users

Medium

URL obscuring128

Table 4: The Software Environment for Cyberproperty

As with Table 3, the information in Table 4 reveals a complex picture. There
are a variety of software-regulatory options, with widely varying levels of
complexity, effectiveness, and overall regulatory effects. It is of course
important to note that Table 4 represents the best available information as of
Summer 2003; as noted above, technology is constantly changing, and ongoing
developments may change the parameters.
Looking closely at Table 4, two observations seem especially important to
understanding the law-software interface here. The first is the relative
inflexibility of the available software options. Note that the only options with
better than ‘low’ scores of flexibility were also quite complex to implement. As
will become more clear below, this inflexibility in the software regulatory
environment has important implications for the analysis here.
Second, and similar to the legal infrastructure, there is a fairly high level of
uncertainty in the net regulatory effects. This—together with the variability in
the options—implies that instability in terms of regulatory effects will be a
concern.
Taken together, Tables 3 and 4 offer an insight into the deep complexity of
regulatory-policy analysis in the cyberspace context. Diverse sources of legal
regulation, each with inherent uncertainty, combine with an array of potential
software regulation possibilities, also with markedly different features. This
recognition illustrates again the necessity of careful, nuanced forms of
regulatory analysis in this context; looking at either the law or the software is not
enough.

126

See, e.g., The Web Robots Pages, at http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/robots.html.

127

See, e.g., Garfinkel, supra note 124, at 280-292.

128

See, e.g., ColdLink Bandwidth Protection Software, http://coldlink.com/?qt=13
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And in fact, the complexity of the law-software interface is perhaps even
greater than the brief overview above. For there is another layer that can be
considered in this context—a look at particular applications of the cyberproperty
right, and the differential ways that the two regulatory modes interact in a more
detailed environment. For example, note that the question of http links to web
pages can actually be subdivided into two applications: links to the ‘top’ pages
of websites (i.e., links to www.law.upenn.edu) versus “deep linking” (i.e., links
to www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/research.html).
And while the legal
infrastructure will operate in much the same way in each case, analyses of the
software options change significantly.
In particular, software regulatory
techniques based on the http_referer header (which reports the referring web
page) will become far more effective in the deep linking context. This is
because, for web pages deep within the web site, the referrer-blocking
mechanisms can be set to allow travel only from other internal pages, whereas
the ‘top’ of the web site will by definition receive hits from a huge array of other
pages (and blocking those is both more difficult and more prone to errors). This
suggests that the software regulatory effects of this particular application of
cyberproperty are likely to be greater than the general case outlined
above—though the weaknesses noted above will of course be equally applicable.
Again, this points out the complexities inherent in cyberspace regulation.

B. The Limit ed Imp act of
Imp ortanc e of Defaul ts

a

Cyb erprope rty

Rul e,

and

the

After surveying the regulatory landscape—both law and software—for
cyberproperty, the analysis turns to considerations of the basic facts of the
current practices in this area. To this end, it is important to recognize the
following observations. First, as demonstrated above, there are at least some
forms of legal effects in place. That is, the various doctrinal hooks noted above
offer website owners at least some legal protection against unwanted access.
Second, again as outlined above, there also exists a range of software regulatory
options, which can also serve a protective function in at least some respects.
Together, these two factors of course suggest that the basic regulatory
framework noted in Section II above is fully applicable—and that a key question
here is to consider the equilibrium point. More important, however, is the
recognition that, notwithstanding the existence of a legal-software regulatory
condition, it appears that in the overwhelming majority of cases, owners of
network resources are choosing to allow generally unimpeded access (referred to
here as a “full access” condition). Precise numbers are virtually impossible to
ascertain, but a reasonable estimate is that approximately 85 percent of web sites
(for example) allow full access. A survey of the top 25 web properties found
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that only one—Ticketmaster.com—appeared to restrict web linking, for example,
in any way, whether legal or technological.129 Of these, only about half used the
robots exclusion standard (robots.txt) to restrict the use of web robots at
all—and none excluded them entirely.130 On the other hand, there are
unquestionably a large number of web sites that are not publicly accessible—that
use various technological means (passwords, access-restricting firewalls, etc.) to
prevent access to virtually all resources (referred to here as a “no access”
condition). Assume, for purposes here, that this group comprises about five
percent of all web sites. Taken together, these estimates suggest that about 90
percent of web sites / web site owners want to allow either virtually full access
to their sites, or want to severely limit access—or that only about ten percent
want a more nuanced set of options (referred to here as “conditional access”).
One way to view this estimate is as an indictment of the entire exercise of
cyberproperty. Arguably, in either the ‘full access’ or ‘no access’ cases, a
cyberproperty regulatory condition is unnecessary: for ‘full access’, no
regulation of any form is needed; and for ‘no access’ the technology exists (see
“Authentication” in Table 2 above) to very effectively cordon off these sites.
Thus the argument goes, why impose the costs and complexity of a regulatory
environment when perhaps 90 percent of the interested parties are being
reasonably well-served without it?
The problem with this approach is that it does not offer a meaningful
solution to the remaining ten percent—who by definition desire to structure their
activities in a way that lies between the ‘full access’ and ‘no access’ conditions:
‘conditional access’. For example, a web site owner might want to implement a
business model that requires site visitors to traverse certain web pages, or to
view certain advertising, or simply to ensure that users consider the offered
materials in their intended context. Other developers may wish to restrict the
types of uses that may occur within the web site, perhaps by enforcing rules for
who can access and when. In each of these cases, neither the ‘full access’ nor
‘no access’ condition addresses the problem effectively.

129

Top 25 according to June 2003 Nielsen/Netratings Data. See http://www.nielsennetratings.com/news.jsp?section=dat_gi.
Ticketmaster.com used a Terms of Service
Agreement to forbid unauthorized deep-linking (but not linking to the top page). See
http://www.ticketmaster.com/h/terms.html. It did not appear that any software regulation
was used.
130

The Robots Exclusion Standard is a voluntary standard to control the behavior
automated web robots (also, ‘bots’ or ‘crawlers’), which are most typically used to index
content for search engines. A web site owner can place a simple text file (names
‘robots.txt’) at the top level of the site; the file defines the scope of access for robots. See
http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/robots.html.
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There is no good reason to believe that the regulatory condition for
cyberproperty should offer only the ‘full access’ or ‘no access’ choices. Indeed,
there are very good reasons to believe that the class of individuals—albeit small,
at an assumed ten percent—who desire more nuanced or detailed regulatory
regimes, should be afforded an appropriate set of regulatory protections. One
reason is that it is this ten percent that is most likely to represent innovation in
business models (or models of presenting information) online. In an era where
most such business models have been financial failures, continued innovation
along this front is imperative to the long-term growth of cyberspace. Stated
another way, to deny regulatory protections that would support innovation in
web-based business models is to assume that we can somehow know and
understand the ‘appropriate’ range of such models well into the future. And yet
if there is one thing we do know about the future of cyberspace, it is that we
likely haven’t even imagined it yet.
Another reason to believe that the regulatory condition for cyberproperty
should address this ten percent is that doing otherwise would spur these web
developers and entrepreneurs to take steps to alter the regulatory conditions
themselves. For example, they might litigate over claims that to many appear
weak.131 This agitation is unlikely to be socially beneficial. For one thing, such
efforts may succeed in ways that create unintended consequences; a judicial
ruling may deeply change the underlying assumptions of the online world (say
by flatly banning web links, or the like). But even if they don’t succeed, their
agitation will almost certainly increase the uncertainty and instability across the
board.
A third important reason that cyberproperty should encompass more complex
options (than the binary “full access” or “no access” options noted above) is that,
as David McGowan has explained, such protections are more likely to support a
ecosystem of diverse online spaces.132 Requiring web sites, for example, to
allow all access or no access (or all-uses, as McGowan describes it) is more
likely to be a recipe for homogeneity than a flourishing of differentiated sites.133
In sum, that the analysis of the cyberproperty right turns centrally on the
needs of a relatively small group—on the (assumed) ten percent of network
resource owners who desire the ability to set access rights in greater
detail—does not present a substantial argument against such regulatory

131

For example, this is a good explanation of Kelly v ArribaSoft, where Kelly was
dissatisfied with the state of protection for his business model in selling his photos through
his web site.
132

McGowan, supra note 26, at 13-17

133

Id.
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conditions. What it does do, however, is point out important considerations for
analysis when evaluating the appropriate balance between law and software.
The first such factor is the importance of establishing a clear default rule.
Here, the recognition that the vast majority of network resources are offered
without much access restrictions suggests: (1) that there are clear benefits to
open access rules; and (2) that the costs of maintaining any cyberproperty
regime will be far lower where the default condition is well-aligned with the
prevailing activity. These observations argue in favor of both establishing a
default rule and setting a relatively stringent requirement for overcoming the
‘full access’ default. By being quite clear about the rule, and by specifying a
relatively high standard to change the default, any concerns about the ‘chilling
effects’ of a cyberproperty regime would be eliminated.134 Indeed, irrespective
of the ultimate quantum of protection in the cyberproperty regime, this would
clearly be an advantage over the present set of circumstances, where several
doctrines offer possible legal remedies, and the question of notice is unclear.
Understanding the importance of the default rule influences the choice
between law and software in this context. On balance, it suggests a move
towards legal regulation rather than software, as the establishment of a default
rule implies that those wishing to alter the rule will have to make at least some
showing about the sufficiency of notice. This requirement of some ‘proof’ of
clear notice of alteration would also minimize uncertainty among those utilizing
the full access rights for most resources. Note that there may well be a role for
software in transacting around the default rule (rather than establishing it): one
possibility might be to require those wishing to alter the default rule of full
access to utilize software techniques to provide notice concerning the changes,
so as to further reduce transaction costs.135 For example, one might establish a
default rule in favor of unfettered web linking, and require any deviations from
this rule to be noted in an electronic tag in the code of the web page (likely in
addition to more traditional human-readable notice).136 So for the all-important
default rule, the analysis suggests that legal code should establish the
parameters, and should perhaps directly regulate (mandate) software code as part
of the process for altering the default condition in favor of full access.

134

Here, for example, a single line in a Terms of Service Agreement would not be
sufficient; far more direct forms of notice would be required.
135

Larry Lessig suggested this possibility to the author, following from experiences with
machine-readable
licensing
in
the
Creative
Commons
project.
See
http://www.creativecommons.com/. Note that a legal requirement for electronic notice is a
form of direct software regulation noted (with tentative approval) in Section IV above.
136

Perhaps a “meta” tag could be developed for this purpose.
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C. The Flexi bility Imp erativ e

As suggested above, there is perhaps no more important consideration in the
context of cyberspace than the necessity, as much as possible, to maintain (and
improve)
the
environment
for
innovation,
experimentation,
and
entrepreneurship. Indeed, this might be safely said to be the hallmark of the
Internet, and the World-Wide-Web in particular; the benefits received thus far
from the inherent mutability of the ‘net have been enormous, and any policy
analysis in this context must remain cognizant of this fact.
The value of flexibility in this context argues rather strongly in favor of a
law-software interface that is more law and less software. As Table 2 amply
demonstrates, many of the currently-available software regulatory techniques
suffer from substantial problems related to inflexibility, especially those that are
likely to have greater regulatory effect. For example, the http_referer-based
techniques allow conditional access only on the basis of the referring
page—perhaps better than no information at all, but unlikely to offer the broad
range of flexible conditions that might otherwise be desired. The mechanisms
related to cookies offer the promise of greater flexibility, stemming from a
cookie’s ability to store a range of information. However, cookies require users
to have prior history with the site, and are quite commonly erased, blocked, or
altered by even technologically unsophisticated web surfers. But the basic point
here is that all of the software options pale in comparison to the flexibility of
contractual arrangements backed by property rights. Indeed, even a rule based
on ‘nuisance’ or other legal definitions of harm, as recommended by Dan
Burk,137 would likely be more flexible than software regulation alone (though
much less flexible than property rules and contracts). In any event, legal code
has a substantial advantage over software code in this context—at least given
current technological circumstances.

D. The Publi c Goo d of Net work Acc ess

There can be little question that access to network resources (whether it be
web linking, or access to email servers, etc.) has important public good
effects—by facilitating the rapid exchange of information and ideas, as well as
by allowing the rapid innovation and development cycles that are a hallmark of

137

Burk, supra note 26, at 53. See infra note 143, and accompanying text.
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the online environment. One argument that has consistently been made against a
cyberproperty right is that such a regulatory condition would, by reducing web
linking (for example), diminish the public good effects of the network. It is very
far from clear, however, that this is true: following from the fact (noted in Part
B. above) that only a small proportion of all networked resources would vary
from an open access approach (and this seems to be by far the most reasonable
assumption), then these concerns should be substantially reduced from the
outset. Indeed, one might actually expect that the provision of a cyberproperty
regulatory regime would prompt the shift of some networked resources (i.e., web
sites) from a “no access” position to one of “conditional access,” or prompt the
development and deployment of additional resources—thereby, in either case,
increasing the quantity of accessible resources, and supporting the public good
of access. Indeed, there seems to be little a priori reason to believe that the
recognition of a cyberproperty right would meaningfully diminish the quantity
or quality of access to network resources.
Yet the recognition of the desirability of access to network
resources—especially “full access”—does offer insights into the law-software
interface problem.
First, it again emphasizes the importance of the
establishment of a powerful default rule in favor of accessibility. As noted in
Part B. above, this criteria argues rather strongly for a predominantly legal
solution, though perhaps with software-implemented transacting.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, consideration of the public
good effects points out the need for a clear and stable regulatory regime. As
Table 2 above (as well as the discussion in Section III) demonstrates, in this
context, given the current state of technology, a predominantly legal framework
seems far more likely to provide stability and clarity going forward.138
Third, as was noted in Section III above, software regulation is likely to be a
relatively poor protector of the public interest inherent in regulatory conditions.
Because software regulation does not require third-party intervention or
consideration of enforcement costs, the expectation is that predominantly
software-based regulation will be potentially more extreme and less stable than
more traditional legal regulations.
Thus, the recognition of the public good aspects of access to network
resources also argues (and rather strongly so) in favor of more law and less
software in the regulatory condition.

138

This argument assumes substantial clarification in the doctrinal framework for the
cyberproperty right.
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E. Cla rity, Sta bility and Certa inty

A general goal of virtually any regulatory condition, but especially one in an
emerging area of social and economic activity, is to establish relatively clear and
stable rules of the game. As noted in Section III above, depending upon the
particular circumstances of the technology, the desire for clarity and stability is
likely to favor one regulatory mechanism—law or software—over another. In
many cases, stability in particular is best served by legal regulation, as the rapid
development of software regulatory technologies means that equilibrium
conditions with large components of software regulation will be faster-changing
(and thus more destabilizing).

F. Cho osing Among For ms of Legal Reg ulatio n

For each of the above issues, an analysis of legal versus software regulation
suggests that the law-software equilibrium in the cyberproperty context should
contain more law and less software. However, as noted in Section III above,
there are a variety of forms of legal-regulatory approaches available; an
important element in any policy analysis is evaluating these as well.
As noted above, the choice of legal rule in the cyberspace context contains
two axes of inquiry.139 The first is the fairly traditional dichotomy between
property rules and liability rules—with the general argument being that property
rules are better where the costs of bargaining are relatively low.140 In the
cyberproperty context, a property rule will establish the basic right of web
developers to determine access—and presume that contractual arrangements
would define the details of such access.141 A liability rule, by contrast, defines
much of the details of the arrangement—typically allowing use except where
certain defined harms occur, whereupon a remedy (usually monetary) will be
granted. In the cyberproperty context, a liability rule would grant access, subject
to harmful acts that would trigger liability—for example, extreme overuse of
bandwidth,142 or forms of linking bordering on misappropriation.143

139

See supra Section III.

140

See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.

141

See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 26, at 22.

142

Perhaps knowingly triggering the ‘slashdot effect.’ See, e.g., Adler, supra note 80.

143

For example, inline linking of others’ images, see Kelly v ArribaSoft, or the framing
of content (displaying content from another site in a ‘frame’ in a web page such that it
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The second dimension of analysis, however, is perhaps even more important:
considering the utility of legal rules that involve forms of legal preemption—the
direct legal regulation of software effects. In the cyberproperty context, legal
preemption rules could range from the outright banning of certain software
regulatory techniques (barring the use of cookies for access redirection, for
example) by supporting software regulations (generally forbidding the obscuring
of the http_referer header, for example), or by supporting transactional
mechanisms (requiring the use of software to provide notice or enable
transactions).

1. The False Choice: Property Rules versus Liability Rules

There have been important recent contributions to the debate concerning the
choice between property and liability rules. Professors McGowan and Epstein,
for example, suggest that bargaining is possible in this context, and that the
property rule dominates.144 Professors Burk and O’Rourke, on the other hand,
contend that the sheer scale of the web access problem, as well as the important
public values inherent in the (freely-networked) Internet, argue instead for a
liability rule.145 A recent decision by the Supreme Court of California comes
down rather strongly in favor of liability rules (if any entitlement is indeed
available at all).146
And yet, as the analytic framework of this Article has suggested, these nowfamiliar arguments on both sides of the property versus liability rule line lack the
richness and contextual detail that is provided by incorporating aspects of
software regulation into the analysis. For it is not quite as simple as property
rules versus liability rules; the recognition of the participation of software
regulation demands a more nuanced approach.
Table 2 from Section III above outlined the general framework for evaluation
here, and it is worth revisiting that table here.

appears to be a part from the local site).
Dan Burk has suggested that a liability rule based on nuisance is the best option here,
noting that such a rule would allow uses unless the costs of any access became
“unreasonably costly.” Burk, supra note 26, at 53.
144

See Epstein, supra note 26, at 84; McGowan, supra note 26, at 30.
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See Burk, supra note 26; O’Rourke, supra note __.
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See, Intel v Hamidi, p. 25-28.
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Rule Form

Flexibility

Institutional
Intervention

Response Time

Transaction
Costs

Embedding
Public Values

Pr op er ty Rule

High

Low

High

High

Low

Li ab il ity R ule

Low

High

Low

Low

High

Table 2 (revisited): Features of Property versus Liability Rules

As was suggested above, the analytic approach is a multi-factor evaluation of
the relative import of these factors in the particular regulatory context, as well as
the way in which any undesirable features of the legal rule-form could be
addressed or ameliorated by using forms of legal preemption as well. The
following provides a brief overview of each factor in Table 2 in this specific
context.

Flexibility. As was noted in the discussion above, the importance of
maintaining—and even improving—the great flexibility of the way web sites are
designed and accessed cannot be understated. To be sure, there is today a
general conception of what a ‘web site’ is, what is does, how it is built,
maintained, and accessed: top-down, generally hierarchical sites; the collection
of related information; the use of ‘pages’ to separate and hold content; the
integration of text, images, and (sometimes) multimedia; internal linking
between pages by the use of menus, etc. Perhaps even more strongly, there is a
conception about the business model of providing web sites: mostly free access
to all-comers; advertising revenue in some cases; an authentication-backed
subscription model in rare cases. But these current conceptions of the ‘way the
web works’ are just that—current conceptions. If there is anything that the
history of the world wide web to date has taught, it is that its great value has
been the huge array of experimental approaches that it has fostered. Many of
these experiments have failed—spectacularly.147 Others have succeeded.148 And
for some prominent players, the jury is still out.149
Recognizing the essential value of experimentation in this context suggests
that the great danger in any regulatory effort here is to codify circa-2003 (or
even earlier) thinking about the web. To no small degree, flexibility is what got

147

Pets.com, Webvan.
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Yahoo!, eBay, Wall Street Journal Online.
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Amazon.com.

[ August 25, 2004

WAGNER | SOFTWARE REGULATION

54 ]

the web to its current point; any choice of legal rule-form must incorporate
flexibility, or risk choking the progress of the online environment. This suggests
that a property rule is strongly favored in this criteria.

Institutional Intervention.
In some ways, the issue of institutional
intervention seems somewhat less important in the web site access context than
it might in an area where the models of information access and distribution are
more complex. The World Wide Web is likely to be one area where regulatory
institutions—the judiciary, regulatory agencies—have some level of familiarity,
and thus one might be less concerned about this issue here. To the extent that
institutional intervention is thought to be important, the reasons are likely to be
derivative of other issues here: requiring institutional intervention implies a
greater response time, or perhaps less flexibility (if the institution has a
constrained view of the medium, for example). This factor appears to favor a
property rule, though its import seems low.

Response time. Like flexibility, a fast response time seems to be particularly
important in the cyberproperty context. This is not only because of changes in
technology, but also because future changes in the way we think about the web,
web sites, and networked information will necessarily require changes in access
models. To this end, a legal rule supporting a faster rather than slower response
time would seem to be broadly advantageous. Thus, this factor seems to favor a
property rule.

Transaction costs. One of the unquestionable drivers of innovation in this
context is the relatively low costs involved in building, developing, and
maintaining a web site. (In some ways, of course, this obscures the fact that the
huge quantity of web sites available mean that great costs are likely to be
required to build traffic.) Thus, anything that would serve to greatly increase the
costs of engaging in such development should be avoided. Indeed, concerns
about transaction costs is perhaps the most-often invoked argument against
property-type rules in the cyberproperty context.150
While transaction costs are at least a plausibly serious concern,151 the choice
of legal rule can fairly easily address it. It might do so in at least two ways.

150

Burk, supra note 26 at 49; Hunter, supra note 5; Lemley, supra note 117.

151

But see McGowan, supra note 26 at 23-25 (arguing that transaction costs will be

low).
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First, the establishment of a ‘strong’ default rule in favor of open access—i.e.,
one that requires meaningful notice to vary the default condition—will, as
suggested above, greatly reduce the quantity of necessary transactions. That is,
the expectation is that the vast majority of web access interactions will be on the
basis of the default open access rule; only in the comparatively rare cases that
vary from the default will any real ‘transaction’ be required. And second, as
discussed further below, the legal rule can incorporate a (weak) form of legal
preemption—requiring software mechanisms to be used for notice and
transaction purposes. This should further reduce costs even for that small
number of cases requiring transactions to alter the default rule.
In sum, transaction costs are an important criteria. As a general matter this
should favor a liability rule, but there are important ways that even a property
rule can be tailored or modified to greatly reduce the liability rule’s advantage
on this criteria.

Embedding Public Values. At least three forms of ‘public values’ are
invoked with respect to the web access issue. The first, and perhaps most
cogent, is the great public value of the globally interconnected network—in the
specific case of cyberproperty, the generally open access afforded to all Internet
users.152 The second public value is related to free expression principles: the
ability of web developers to generally use web technologies (linking, access, etc)
as part of their expressive purpose.153 The third value is more closely related to
competition issues: the concern that more variance in access requirements will
allow some sites (especially commercial sites) to limit competition by imposing
access requirements.154
There can be little doubt that there is great public value inherent in the
Internet, and in widespread web site access in particular. The question is how
much this impacts a choice of rule analysis. For if the assumption noted above
is correct—that perhaps 85-90 percent of web developers affirmatively want
open access to their sites—then there is good reason to believe that, given the
appropriate default condition, the particular choice of legal rule won’t affect the
vast majority of web sites. That is, if the default rule is one of open access, then
even the imposition of a reasonably strong property rule-form shouldn’t have
much impact on this 85 percent. This is even more the case if reasonable
hurdles are established to change the default condition, such as clear notice

152

Burk, supra note 26; Hunter, supra note 5; Lemley, supra note 117.
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See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 5, at 488-494.
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See, e.g., O’Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 26 at 1978-78.
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requirements or the use of technological means to provide notice or facilitate
transactions. And, as noted above, the effect on the remaining 10-15 percent of
the sites is unclear; it may well be that the granting of a strong entitlement under
a property rule will yield greater development, and thus more available
information, even if the access rules are not fully open. Thus, while the values
of the Internet are clearly important, it is far from clear how much such
considerations affect the choice of a legal rule-form.
It is less clear that the other two expressed public values have as much
special cognizance in the cyberproperty context, rather than raising general
questions about the nature of property rights or the applicability of standard
competition policy rules. Private entitlements often raise troublesome questions
about their relationship to public interests in free expression; as a general matter,
society deals with such questions by broadly allowing private rightsholders to
enforce their rights under neutral laws without raising first amendment
objections.155 In some cases, narrow exceptions to property rules might be
warranted.156 In any event, as with the ‘global network’ argument, some of the
concern can be diluted by the imposition of a default rule of open access and
reasonable notice requirements. In similar fashion, the value of preserving
competition is surely important, but seems to go more towards corporate
behavior as measured by traditional competition policy principles rather than the
choice of legal rule-form for a general cyberproperty entitlement.157
As a general matter, this prong seems to favor a liability rule, though perhaps
less strongly when compared with a property rule incorporating the default
condition noted above. (And even less strongly when compared to a property
rule with some narrow exceptions.)

How one balances the factors above to determine a ‘final’ result is, as befits
a normative analysis, a matter of considerable debate. Although the analysis
above suggests with some force that a property rule may ‘edge out’ a liability
rule in the specific context here, there is no doubt that the case is quite open; a
reasonable policy analysis could come out the other way. The more important
point is that, regardless of the outcome of the normative analysis, the inquiry is
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See, e.g., Rowan v United States Post Office Department, 397 US 501, 509 (1970).;
Harper & Row, Eldred v Reno. See also Epstein, supra note 26 at 86-87; McGowan, supra
note 26 at 15-16.
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See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001) (fair use).

See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004). See also
McGowan, supra note 26 at 27-28 (doubting the possibility of widespread anticompetitive
behavior in this context).
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far from over. The normative decision must be considered in light of what
Section IV above described as an instrumental inquiry: how does the choice of
legal rule-form interact with the relevant software regulatory environment. It is
this question to which the analysis now turns.

2. Hybridization in the Choice of Legal Rules

Section IV above demonstrated that choices of legal rule-forms cannot occur
in a vacuum; they must incorporate an understanding of the rule’s instrumental
performance—the ability to affect the law-software interface—as well as address
the policy option of a third rule-form: legal preemption, or the direct regulation
of software effects.
Policy analysts will want to consider the instrumental performance of a legal
rule-form for two reasons. First, if Section III is correct in noting the serious
public-related concerns with software regulation, then there is significant value
in choosing a rule-form that minimizes (or at least doesn’t maximize) software
regulation. Second, and irrespective of whether one believes the potentially
negative effects of over-use of software regulation, Section II demonstrated that
the net regulatory effects of a legal change will likely be unpredictable, absent
consideration (and perhaps influence) of the software regulatory response.158
In the cyberproperty context, there is little to suggest that the general
approach outlined in Section IV above does not apply. That is, an instrumental
consideration of the choice of legal rules suggests that property rules are likely
to perform significantly better than liability rules along this rubric, and that
indeed, liability rules appear to be ineffective, except when paired with legal
preemption rules.159 This, then, suggests that the real analysis under the
instrumental prong is among various forms of hybridization between traditional
legal rules and legal preemption rules.
Indeed, it appears that the cyberproperty example offers a strong case for
legal hybridization. There are a variety of potential software regulatory
mechanisms available; while none seem attractive standing alone, the normative
analysis above highlighted the possibility that such mechanisms might provide
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See supra Section II; see also text accompanying Figure 2.

See supra notes 98-112 and accompanying text. Property rules are likely to perform
better as they offer an attractive alternative to software—because of their potential strength
(quantity of legal effects, to use the terminology above), and their greater flexibility.
Liability rules generally contain neither feature, and are thus likely to be an unattractive
alternative. See id.
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important benefits. One promising option that springs out of the framework
above is the combination of a property rule and a transactional form of legal
preemption rule; that is, one having the following features:
(a) Property rule: a rule that generally offers clear entitlements to
injunctive remedies to web site owners for unauthorized
access; and
(b) Default condition: a default presumption in favor of open
access, with nontrivial requirements of notice to vary this
default; and
(c) Legal Preemption (weak form): encouragement or
requirement for the use of software techniques to implement
any transactions that might be required.
This rule provides much of the benefits of a property rule, yet uses the
default rule and legal preemption to reduce any transaction cost effects. Because
it both provides a strong property rule and offers some legal preemption, it
should stabilize the law-software interface by providing an attractive alternative
to the various software regulation options noted in Table 4 above.
Note that this result is very similar to the current, albeit voluntary, practice
related to the behavior of web ‘robots’ (or automated search indexers): a general
default in favor of open indexing, with the use of a technological
mechanism—the robots.txt file noted above—to change the default condition. It
is also related to the result in eBay v Bidder’s Edge, which fundamentally
upheld the access conditions established by eBay’s robots.txt file.160

This Section has applied the analytic framework developed in this Article to
the particular regulatory challenge of cyberproperty. By integrating a detailed
understanding of the software regulatory environment into the approach, a
richer, more nuanced analysis was available. Consistent with the general
observations, this Section suggests that in the cyberproperty context, an overreliance on software regulation is likely to be socially detrimental. This fact
then informs the choice of a legal rule-form, arguing in favor of a hybrid legal
regime that has the basic attributes of a property right, tempered by both a
default condition and a form of legal preemption.
This conclusion, however—that a hybrid property rule is best under these
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See eBay v Bidder’s Edge, supra.

Note also that Professors McGowan and Epstein reach a generally similar result, albeit
via a different analytic path. See McGowan, supra note 26; Epstein, supra note 26.
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particular circumstances—is necessarily conditional along a variety of
dimensions.
Consistent with a theme of this paper, as technological
circumstances change, the analysis will almost certainly change as well.
Furthermore, notwithstanding its multifaceted nature, the process followed here
requires a number of balancing decisions—at least some of which could easily
yield a different result. What is more important, however, is that the case of
cyberproperty demonstrates both the challenges and the benefits of
understanding the law-software interface.

C O N C L U S IO N

This Article has developed (and applied) a detailed analytic framework for
the evaluation of regulatory policy in the cyberspace context. This new
approach is in part a reminder of what cyberlaw has already taught—that both
legal and software code have regulatory effects. But it is also an insight into
lessons yet to be fully learned: that the intimate relationship between law and
software in these modern regulatory environments demands a different, more
complex and multidimensional, form of policy analysis. Law and software
together define the regulatory condition; considering one without the other is
fundamentally incomplete. Less law does not necessarily mean more freedom.
This deeply contextual inquiry into the relative (and additive) effects of law
and software also reveals important limitations in software as a regulatory
mechanism, suggesting that software compares poorly (at least from a public
perspective) with legal regulation. Thus, an important aspect of regulatory
policy analysis in this context is the extent to which the equilibrium between law
and software is modulated appropriately.
And while the framework is necessarily highly dependent upon the context
of any regulatory analysis—the specific technological and legal facts
involved—it appears that in many cases property rules or those that directly
relate to the corresponding software regulation (forms of legal preemption) will
dominate. Flexibility in legal rules is paramount; traditional liability rules
appear to be especially unsuited for this environment.

Considering the regulatory environment of cyberspace from the perspective
of the framework of this Article may have profound effects on the way we think
about the form and function of law in the modern regulatory environment.
Indeed, the framework developed here is likely to have broad applicability to
contexts beyond cyberlaw. As software (and thus regulation-by-software)
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becomes increasingly ubiquitous in areas such as media creation and distribution
and telecommunications, for example, the relevance of analytic processes that
address both law and software will only increase. Software regulation is
unquestionably here to stay. The real question is whether our policy approaches
can meaningfully account for this trend, and whether the case against software
will be fully understood.

THE TECHNOLOGY

OF

A P P E N D IX A
S O F T WA R E -A S S I S T E D C Y B E R P R O P E RT Y

The specifics of the legal preemption recommended above could take a
variety of forms. One general approach would use metadata embedded in web
pages to specify (non-default) access and linking requirements. Metadata is
information about other information; many forms of metadata are already in
widespread use online. For example, “metatags” for the following descriptive
features of a web page are common:161

Metatag
Keywords
Description

PICS-Label162

Description of Use
lists subjects of the web page,
intended to assist web searching and
indexing
describes the content of the web
page, intended to assist in web
searching
describes the type and nature of
content on a web page in code form;
some web browsers allow users to
block pages with certain attributes
(e.g., ‘sexuality’ or ‘violence)

Syntax
<meta name="keywords"
content=”[…keywords…]">
<meta name="description"
content=”[…description…]">
<meta name="pics-label"
content=”[codes indicating the level of
certain types of content] ">

tells the web browser what
specification the page is encoded for

<meta name="content-type"
content=”[codes indicating the level of
certain types of content] ">

Expires

used for caching purposes; an
‘expired’ page is not served by the
caching mechanism

<meta name="expires" content=”[date
and time] ">

Author

tags for the author of the content

<meta name="author" content=”[author
name]">

tags for the software used to create
the content

<meta name="author"
content=”[software name]">

Content-type

Generator

161

For a good general overview of the following metatags and the way they work, see
Scott
Clark,
META
Tag
Tutorial,
Webdeveloper.com,
at
http://www.webdeveloper.com/html/html_metatags.html. See also Scott Clark, META Tag
Resources,
Webdeveloper.com,
at
http://www.webdeveloper.com/html/html_metatag_res.html
162

See, e.g., W3C,
http://www.w3.org/PICS/
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Metadata that described access and/or linking policies would then be
available for a variety of automated or machine-assisted tasks. For example:
(a) Web browsers could be configured to load only those pages
with certain metadata, for example, ‘open-access’; or
(b) Information about linking rights could be utilized by, for
example, web development software packages or linkcheckers to allow automated ‘clearance’ of linked-to sites.163
More sophisticated technologies could use metadata information to perform
actual transactions:
(a) Perhaps a $0.0001 charge per page view of the Wall Street
Journal Online could be deducted from one’s bank account;
or
(b) Web development software could report the conditions upon
which linking is authorized—“only link to Home”; “only
send 1000 hits per day”; “no traffic on Tuesdays”—which
could of course be incorporated into modern dynamically
created web sites.164

Obviously, none of this software currently exists; the point is that the basic
building-block technologies do, and that given the appropriate incentives, one
can expect this sort of technology to develop over time.
An outstanding example of the building of metadata technologies in a similar
context is the Creative Commons project, which aims (in part) to facilitate
automated or machine-assisted transactions concerning copyrighted materials.
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Link-checker software is commonly used to verify that all links (both internal and
external) on a page are ‘live’ (i.e., working). It would be relatively easy to incorporate
actions or reporting of such programs based on the metadata encountered.
164

See, e.g., Phillip Greenspun, Database Backed Web Sites: The Thinking Persons
Guide to Web Publishing (1997).

